This essay attempts to interrogate the distinct character of Peter Sloterdijk’s declaration of the absolute imperative that concludes his work, You Must Change Your Life, by contextualizing it within the development of his notion of anthropotechnics. In particular, the essays examine the claim that his is a new and unprecedented form of the absolute imperative that is alone able to address, in an effective way, the contemporary global crises that are confronting us now. The first sections trace out the ways (...) in which this new imperative differs from previous forms of the imperative, including the categorical, the aesthetic, and the existential-ontological. The latter sections then discuss how the new form of the imperative is connected to Sloterdijk’s radical attempt at a rethinking of the essence of the human as always already technological, which is the very project of anthropotechnics. This leads finally to a discussion of Sloterdijk’s polemical engagement with Heidegger’s question concerning technology, in which I trace out his attempt at a sweeping translation of Heidegger’s notion of enframing [Gestell] into enhousing [Gehäuse] and the consequences thereof. (shrink)

This essay attempts to interrogate the distinct character of Peter Sloterdijk’s declaration of the absolute imperative that concludes his work, You Must Change Your Life, by contextualizing it within the development of his notion of anthropotechnics. In particular, the essays examine the claim that his is a new and unprecedented form of the absolute imperative that is alone able to address, in an effective way, the contemporary global crises that are confronting us now. The first sections trace out the ways (...) in which this new imperative differs from previous forms of the imperative, including the categorical, the aesthetic, and the existential-ontological. The latter sections then discuss how the new form of the imperative is connected to Sloterdijk’s radical attempt at a rethinking of the essence of the human as always already technological, which is the very project of anthropotechnics. This leads finally to a discussion of Sloterdijk’s polemical engagement with Heidegger’s question concerning technology, in which I trace out his attempt at a sweeping translation of Heidegger’s notion of enframing [Gestell] into enhousing [Gehäuse] and the consequences thereof. (shrink)

The paper, on the one hand, presents a reconstruction of the origin and development of the concepts of “anthropotechnics” and “homeotechnics” in Peter Sloterdijk’s thought, of the anthropological basis of his social philosophy, and of the question of subjectivity addressed in his book You Must Change Your Life (2009). On the other hand, it investigates with a critical aim the different forms of otherness that Sloterdijk theorizes in his philosophical works and the possible solipsistic implications of this concept.

A diferencia de la ciudad medieval y de la metrópolis decimonónica, la lógica de funcionamiento de las actuales postmetrópolis se basa en un incremento sin parangón de la movilidad de personas, mercancías y capitales. Frente a la división ciudad -campo, propia del medioevo, y a la división producción -consumo, característica de la metrópolis clásica, la postmetrópolis ha multiplicado exponencialmente la diversidad y transversalidad de sus principales divisiones. En consecuencia, el sujeto político hegemónico generado por la nueva condición postmetropolitana ya no (...) coincide con los desarrollados anteriormente. Este artículo indaga en los dos principales modelos concebidos por la filosofía contemporánea a partir de un análisis de las nuevas condiciones urbanas en las que se desarrollan esos sujetos: el concepto de multitud de Negri y el de emprendedor creativo descrito por Sloterdijk. Aunque sus concepciones y categorías sociopolíticas difieren, ambos autores coinciden en establecer una relación productiva bidireccional entre el medio y el sujeto. (shrink)

This article interprets David Lynch's Mulholland Drive (2001) to argue for the morphological influence cinematic images have on modernity's monstrous identity. It shows how Lynch's tactic of interweaving apparently discrete spaces of dream and reality – one often inverting or uncannily ironising the other – relies on the virtual space of cinema, which leaves a mark on understanding, irrespective of its apparent truth. To do so, I employ Peter Sloterdijk's philosophy of space – especially the spherology developed in his Spheres (...) trilogy – and Bernard Stiegler's approach to cinematic phenomenology to consider the transferential force of cinema, and its power to cultivate and shape popular consciousness. Mulholland Drive is acutely aware of this force, and its interplay with the expectations and disappointments of Hollywood monstrosity inserts itself into the sphere-forming traffic of modern meaning-making. In doing so, I argue, the film takes up Lynch's familiar approach to irony and the weird to unwind the destructive uniformity of Hollywood hegemony. The productive bifurcations that result, inscribed in between cinema and consciousness, and forgettable as the very spheric intimacy of memory, gesture to what might live beyond discrete forms. (shrink)