Corpo onirico e onirismo del corpo: verso una filosofia dell'appartenenza nell'ultimo Merleau-Ponty

InCircolo - Rivista di Filosofia E Culture 11 (11):83-105 (2021)
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Abstract

Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is well known for its constant questioning of numerous theoretical preconceptions. In accordance with this perspective, this essay presents Merleau-Ponty’s observations on the oneiric experience and discusses their challenges of the mind-body dualism. Despite the critique of the Sartrian conception of dream as a result of conscience’s selffascination, the philosopher sheds light on the only valuable intuition provided by the sartrian analysis, namely a kind of passivity within the oneiric subject. However, according to Merleau-Ponty, this passivity can be properly seized only by refusing the preconception of “conscience”, thus leading to the discovery of the concept of “field of existence” as the true oneiric “subject”. After having described the structure of this field through “existentials”, this paper argues that Merleau-Ponty’s retrieval of the Freudian notion of symbolism enables him to root the passivity discovered within the dreaming experience. The concept of “symbolism”, typically associated with the oneiric environment, will thus be acknowledged as the true “subject” of the dream and, more generally, of the whole existence – dream being for Merleau-Ponty a modelling of life itself. However, in his latest works, the body is equally identified as the true subject of the dream. An analysis of the oneiric corporeality in its intimate relation with symbolism will therefore disclose meaningful insights to conceive our belonging and to furtherly challenge the mind-body dualism.

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Giulia Andreini
Università IULM, Milano

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