Essentially Intentional Action

Abstract

Anscombe famously said that there are some act types that can only be done intentionally. We defend this claim: some act types are essentially intentional. We argue that Ving intentionally is itself essentially intentional: it is not possible to be non-intentionally Ving intentionally. And we show how this explains why various other act types—such as trying, lying, and thanking—are essentially intentional. Finally, building on Piñeros Glassock (2020) and Beddor & Pavese (2022), we explain how this makes trouble for the thesis that if I am Ving intentionally, I know that I am Ving.

Author Profiles

Ginger Schultheis
University of Chicago
Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt
Center for Advanced Studies, Berlin: Human Abilities & Freie Universität Berlin

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Added to PP
2024-04-29

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