There is a long history of philosophers granting a privileged epistemic status to cognition of directly present objects. In this paper, I examine three important historic accounts which provide different models of this cognitive state and its connection with its objects: that of the Stoics, who are corporealists and think that ordinary perception may have an epistemically privileged status, but who seem to struggle to accommodate non-perceptual cognizance; that of Augustine, who thinks that incorporeal objects are directly present to us (...) in ‘intellectual perception’, and that, by way of contrast, ordinary sense-perception does not have a privileged epistemic status; and that of William of Ockham, who allows for unmediated action at a distance and is fairly generous about what counts as being directly present. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper aims to establish the problems of the Stoic concept of cognitive representation (καταληπτική φαντασία). So I intend to reconstruct the scholarly debate on this definition. For it, I state the debate around its two most conflictive terms: the participle ὑπάρχον and the preposition ἀπό. By analyzing the Stoic fragments in which these terms appear, I explore both textual and philosophical arguments in order to find the different senses of both. By doing so, my aim is highlighting the (...) limits of those interpretations. My conclusion is proposing certain issues to constitute a research agenda on the Stoic definition of cognitive representation, in order to, to some extent, possible solutions might be discerned.---- . Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar cuáles son y en qué consisten los problemas interpretativos de la definición estoica de representación cognitiva (καταληπτική φαντασία). Para tal fin, propongo una reconstrucción del debate académico sobre esta definición. Dicha reconstrucción articula el debate en torno a sus dos términos más problemáticos: el participio ὑπάρχον y la preposición ἀπό. A partir de un análisis de los fragmentos estoicos en los que aparecen estos términos, exploro las razones tanto filosóficas como textuales a favor y en contra de cada uno de los diferentes sentidos de ἀπό y cada una de las diferentes acepciones de ὑπάρχον. Al hacer esto, me propongo evidenciar las limitaciones de las interpretaciones de la definición de representación cognitiva que se han propuesto. Basándome en este examen, propongo en las conclusiones una serie de cuestiones centrales que deben formar parte de la agenda de investigación sobre la definición estoica de representación cognitiva. De esta manera, pueden observarse los retos que supone defender una interpretación determinada y, en cierta medida, podrían también vislumbrarse posibles soluciones. (shrink)

We argue that the extant evidence for Stoic logic provides all the elements required for a variable-free theory of multiple generality, including a number of remarkably modern features that straddle logic and semantics, such as the understanding of one- and two-place predicates as functions, the canonical formulation of universals as quantified conditionals, a straightforward relation between elements of propositional and first-order logic, and the roles of anaphora and rigid order in the regimented sentences that express multiply general propositions. We consider (...) and reinterpret some ancient texts that have been neglected in the context of Stoic universal and existential propositions and offer new explanations of some puzzling features in Stoic logic. Our results confirm that Stoic logic surpasses Aristotle’s with regard to multiple generality, and are a reminder that focusing on multiple generality through the lens of Frege-inspired variable-binding quantifier theory may hamper our understanding and appreciation of pre-Fregean theories of multiple generality. (shrink)