Predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception are unique not merely in that they postulate a unity between perception and imagination. Rather, they are unique in claiming that perception should be conceptualised in terms of imagination and that the two involve an identity of neural implementation. This paper argues against this postulated unity, on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, the manner in which PP theorists link perception and imagination belies an impoverished account of imagery as cloistered from the external world (...) in its intentionality, akin to a virtual reality, as well as endogenously generated. Yet this ignores a whole class of imagery whose intentionality is directed on the actual environment—projected mental imagery—and also ignores the fact that imagery may be triggered crossmodally in a bottom-up, stimulus-driven way. Empirically, claiming that imagery and perception share neural circuitry ignores relevant clinical results in this area. These evidence substantial perception/imagery neural dissociations, most notably in the case of aphantasia. Taken together, the arguments here suggest that PP theorists should substantially temper, if not outright abandon, their claim to a perception/imagination unity. (shrink)

Aphantasia, a recently labelled spectrum condition affecting mental imagery, has brought to the fore the centrality of imagination in our lives. Intuitively it may seem that we cannot have a normal life without the possession of imaginative abilities. Yet, aphantasics do not seem to be much affected by their condition. Can aphantasia tell us anything about the nature and role of our imaginative abilities? I contend that an important distinction that can shed light on this question has been largely overlooked, (...) namely that between two senses of mental imagery: as a type of mental content (viz., mental imagery strictly speaking), and as a kind of psychological attitude (viz., sensory imagination). Drawing on this distinction, I suggest three possible conditions: (i) impairment in mental imagery only, (ii) impairment in sensory imagination only, (iii) impairment in both mental imagery and sensory imagination. I show that core cases of aphantasia are better understood as impairments in sensory imagination only, but I indicate empirical strategies to investigate whether some cases of aphantasia rather involve impairments in mental imagery, which would point toward a plurality of forms of aphantasia. Sensory imagination, however, does not exhaust the imaginative realm, therefore we shouldn’t jump to the hasty conclusion that aphantasics have no imagination. Most aphantasics lack sensory imagination, but arguably can exploit other forms of imagination. This would explain in which sense they still possess imaginative abilities. (shrink)

Aphantasia, i.e., the inability to voluntarily form visual mental images, affects approximately 2 to 5 percent of the population and plays an important role in a more general debate revolving around the role of imagery for our cognition. This thesis investigates aphantasia by means of an interdisciplinary approach, combining insights from contemporary neuroscientific research with historical philosophical arguments, with a specific focus on the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. A new theoretical concept, meta-imagination, is developed and it is argued that (...) the concept can explain why aphantasics perform successfully on a wide range of visual imagery tasks, thus providing important implications for the more general debate about the connection between imagery and cognition. (shrink)

As awareness of the phenomenon of aphantasia (= lack of voluntary imagery) has increased in recent years, many psychotherapists ponder its clinical implications. The present study investigates whether aphantasia meets the criteria for mental disorders, i.e. statistical rarity, impairment in activities of daily living, violation of social norms and inappropriate behavior and personal distress. Prevalence of aphantasia was determined meta-analytically based on 3,543 participants. An international sample of 156 participants with aphantasia (58.3% male; Mage = 35.23) and 131 controls (65.6% (...) male; Mage = 28.88) was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the Questionnaire for the Assessment of Everyday Memory Performance and the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire, as well as measures of depression, anxiety and well-being. The prevalence of aphantasia was estimated at 3.5 to 4.8%. Participants with aphantasia scored significantly lower than controls on every day and autobiographical memory, but not on theory of mind. A subgroup of 34.7% of participants with aphantasia reported distress significantly associated with lower well-being and high levels of anxiety and depression. The level of distress increased with poorer performance in autobiographical memory and theory of mind. Although aphantasia meets the criterion of statistical rarity, the impact on activities of daily living and personal distress is too weak to justify a classification as a mental disorder. In a subgroup, however, distress can reach clinically relevant levels. In individual cases, it is therefore advisable to conduct a psychological assessment, for example by means of the Aphantasia Distress Questionnaire. (shrink)