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Internal Perspectivalism: The Solution to Generality Problems About Proper Function and Natural Norms.Jason Winning - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (33):1-22.details
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Levels and kinds of explanation: lessons from neuropsychiatry.Sam Wilkinson - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Emotional Actions Without Goals.Isaac Wiegman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):393-423.details
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Deceptive Appearances: the Turing Test, Response-Dependence, and Intelligence as an Emotional Concept.Michael Wheeler - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (4):513-532.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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Tarski's theory of truth and field's solution to the problem of intentionality.Peter Weatherall - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):291 – 304.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.Robyn Repko Waller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5175-5203.details
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Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):33-51.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.details
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Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności.Maciej Tarnowski - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):323-353.details
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Real intentionality.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (3):287-313.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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Functional explanations and reasons as causes.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:137-164.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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'Encouragement in Darwin'?Patrick Rysiew - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):271-286.details
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Current Perspectives in Philosophy of Biology.Joaquin Suarez Ruiz & Rodrigo A. Lopez Orellana - 2019 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 14:7-426.details
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Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions.Jakub Rudnicki & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-21.details
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Words in contexts: Fregean elucidations.Hans Rott - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):621-643.details
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The phenomenal stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.details
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A Kantian stance on the intentional stance.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.details
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Naturalizing idealizations: Pragmatism and the interpretivist strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.details
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Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):93-109.details
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The Empirical Case against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.details
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Infallibilism about self-knowledge.T. Parent - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.details
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A Pragmatic Approach to the Intentional Stance Semantic, Empirical and Ethical Considerations for the Design of Artificial Agents.Guglielmo Papagni & Sabine Koeszegi - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (4):505-534.details
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Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesis.Søren Overgaard & Alessandro Salice - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1-25.details
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Interpreting ordinary uses of psychological and moral terms in the AI domain.Hyungrae Noh - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-33.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
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Mental Fictionalism As an Undermotivated Theory.Miklós Márton & János Tözsér - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):622-638.details
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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.details
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Emotional Depth.John M. Monteleone - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):779-800.details
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