- The Expertise Defense and Experimental Philosophy of Free Will.Kiichi Inarimori - 2024 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 24:125-143.details
|
|
Arguments over Intuitions?Tomasz Wysocki - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):477-499.details
|
|
Order effects in moral judgment.Alex Wiegmann, Yasmina Okan & Jonas Nagel - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):813-836.details
|
|
Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.Konrad Werner - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1725-1751.details
|
|
The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2015 - Discipline Filosofiche 25 (1):23-42.details
|
|
Are philosophers expert intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.details
|
|
The experimental critique and philosophical practice.Tinghao Wang - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):89-109.details
|
|
Referential intuitions are still problematic.Massimiliano Vignolo & Filippo Domaneschi - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):472-483.details
|
|
Intuitions on Semantic Reference.Massimiliano Vignolo & Filippo Domaneschi - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):755-778.details
|
|
Quantitative methods in philosophy of language.Rafael Ventura - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (7):e12609.details
|
|
Intentional Action Without Knowledge.Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele & David Rose - 2020 - Synthese 197:1-13.details
|
|
Philosophical methodology: The current debate.Anand J. Vaidya - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):391-417.details
|
|
The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions.Krist Vaesen, Martin Peterson & Bart Van Bezooijen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):559-578.details
|
|
A defence of experimental philosophy in aesthetics.Clotilde Torregrossa - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):885-907.details
|
|
Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.details
|
|
A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition.Damián Enrique Szmuc - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.details
|
|
Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names.Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood, Ryoji Sato & Mineki Oguchi - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):213-230.details
|
|
A New Perspective Concerning Experiments on Semantic Intuitions.Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):315-332.details
|
|
What is Experimental Philosophy?Stephen Stich - 2015 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:21-31.details
|
|
Western Skeptic vs Indian Realist. Cross-Cultural Differences in Zebra Case Intuitions.Krzysztof Sękowski, Adrian Ziółkowski & Maciej Tarnowski - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):711-733.details
|
|
Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.details
|
|
The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
|
|
Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.details
|
|
Philosophical Expertise and Philosophical Methodology.Hamid Seyedsayamdost - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):110-129.details
|
|
Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.details
|
|
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):592-608.details
|
|
Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
|
|
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2015 - Cognition 141 (C):127-137.details
|
|
Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
|
|
Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2671-2695.details
|
|
Neo-Confucianism, experimental philosophy and the trouble with intuitive methods.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):812-828.details
|
|
Folk Moral Relativism.Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Cole Wright & Joshua Knobe - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.details
|
|
In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.details
|
|
Persistence through function preservation.David Rose - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):97-146.details
|
|
Intentional action without knowledge.David Rose, Alfred Mele & Romy Vekony - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1231-1243.details
|
|
Folk Mereology is Teleological.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):238-270.details
|
|
Reflective Intuitions about the Causal Theory of Perception across Sensory Modalities.Pendaran Roberts, Keith Allen & Kelly Schmidtke - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):257-277.details
|
|
Reflective intuitions about the causal theory of perception across sensory modalities.R. Roberts, K. Allen & Kelly Schmidtke - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):257-277.details
|
|
Concepts and Analytic Intuitions.Bradley Rives - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.details
|
|
Feedback from moral philosophy to cognitive science.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):569-588.details
|
|
How not to test for philosophical expertise.Regina A. Rini - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):431-452.details
|
|
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.details
|
|
Trope analysis and folk intuitions.Stephanie Rennick - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5025-5043.details
|
|
Empirical research on folk moral objectivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5).details
|
|
Moral Progress, Knowledge and Error: Do People Believe in Moral Objectivity?Thomas Pölzler, Lieuwe Zijlstra & Jacob Dijkstra - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.details
|
|
An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1141-1169.details
|
|
Broad, subjective, relative: the surprising folk concept of basic needs.Thomas Pölzler, Tobu Tomabechi & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):319-347.details
|
|
De l’impossibilité du savoir intuitif conçu comme état purement mental et d’une difficulté que cela soulève pour l’évidentialisme1.Jimmy Plourde - 2017 - Philosophiques 44 (1):85-101.details
|
|
The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1253-1276.details
|
|
Intuition as a Capacity for a Priori Knowledge.Henry W. Pickford - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (28):147-169.details
|
|