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Rea on Naturalism

Philo 7 (2):131-137 (2004)

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  1. Rea’s Revenge and the Persistent Problem of Persistence for Realism.Bradley Jay Strawser - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):375-391.
    Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections; many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually (...)
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