The subject of agnosticism about the existence of God has emerged in many of the major conversations within analytic philosophy of religion, such as the debate on the nature of evidence for and against religious beliefs. In this article, I outline a map of the debate on agnosticism in religious epistemology—especially in relation to evidentialism—highlighting the significance of the problem of the ambiguity of evidence and connecting said problem to discussions of religious language and peer disagreement.

In 'Weak agnosticism defended' Graham Oppy set out to ’show that agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism’. Oppy begins by differentiating between strong agnosticism, which obliges rational persons to suspend judgment on the question of God’s existence, and weak agnosticism, which allows rational persons to do so. Weak agnosticism is thus the philosophical position that it is possible and rational - but not obligatory - to suspend judgment on the question (...) of God’s existence. The question I discuss in this paper is whether one can consistently practice agnosticism, as opposed to merely suspending judgment regarding the existence of God? Does acceptance of the the sis that ’agnosticism can be so formulated that it is no less philosophically respectable than theism and atheism’ entail the possibility of actual consistent practice of agnosticism? (shrink)