Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169 (2011)
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Abstract

In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false.

Author's Profile

Gregor Damschen
University of Oldenburg

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