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Law’s Artifactual Nature: How Legal Institutions Generate Normativity
In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 247-266 (2015)
Abstract
I argue that law is best understood as an institutionalized abstract artifact. Using the ideas of John Searle on institutions and Amie Thomasson on artifacts, I show how the law is capable of generating new reasons for action, arguing against recent work by David Enoch who holds that legal reason-giving is ultimately a form of triggering conditional reasons.Author's Profile
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2015-11-12
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575 (#29,255)
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89 (#52,756)
2015-11-12
Downloads
575 (#29,255)
6 months
89 (#52,756)
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