Dissertation, (
2018)
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Abstract
“Substance-in-relation” is W. Norris CLARKE’s own contribution
to the thought of Aquinas on the metaphysics of the human person. Clarke
argues that a dynamic notion of the human person with an intrinsic dynamic
substance and a primordial relation is implicit in the thought of Aquinas
and he wants to make them explicit. His approach was to “creatively
retrieve” this intrinsic dynamic notion in Aquinas and to “complete” it with
the rich relational notion that was well-developed by some contemporary
existential phenomenologists, personalists and psychotherapists. He argues
that the human person possesses dyadic structures of substance and relation
that are equally primordial. So, for him, “to be” a human person is to be a
“substance-in-relation.” This implies that substance alone, even though
dynamic, is insufficient to constitute a human person. In this way, Clarke
seems to differ from Aquinas who argued that the human person is a
substance composed of body and soul. In fact, the conclusions reached by
Clarke on the basic seminal ideas of the human person leaned more towards
the thoughts of the above contemporary thinkers than that of Aquinas,
suggesting that he must have departed significantly from St. Thomas. This
raises doubt about to what extent he retrieved the thought of Aquinas. This
research, therefore, is an attempt to furnish some elements that would help
the reader to evaluate whether Clarke’s work could be considered more as a
“creative retrieval” or more as a “creative completion” of the thought of
Aquinas. The method employed here is to trace the background to the
formation of Clarke’s thought. There is also an analysis of his thought. This
is followed by a critical analysis of his notion of human substance and of
relation. Finally, certain elements are furnished to help the reader in this
evaluation.