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Biased modality and epistemic weakness with the future and MUST: non- veridicality, partial knowledge
In J. Et al Blaszack (ed.), ense, Mood, and Modality : New Perspectives on Old Questions. Chicago University Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
We defend the view of epistemic `must' as weak and claim that `must p' is used when the speaker does not know p. Novel arguments for this well-known account are provided. The theory is extended to epistemic future.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2015-10-16
Downloads
306 (#55,105)
6 months
63 (#73,004)
2015-10-16
Downloads
306 (#55,105)
6 months
63 (#73,004)
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