The Case for a Duty to Use Gender-Fair Language in Democratic Representation

The Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In the light of a study of the di erence between political actors and ordinary citizens as language users, and based on three moral arguments (consequence-based, recognition-based, and complicity-based), we propose that democratic representatives have an imperfect duty to use gender-fair-language in their public communication. In the case of members of the executive, such as ministries, prime ministries, and presidents, such an imperfect duty could also be justi ed on democratic grounds. Their choice of using a gender-unfair language, we argue, can cast doubts on the fundamental democratic commitment to respect the agency of all present and future citizens as potential participants in the law-making process.

Author Profiles

Martina Rosola
Università degli Studi di Genova
Corrado Fumagalli
Università degli Studi di Genova

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