The radical redefinition of the landscape of physics that followed the contributions of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg at the start of the 20th century led to plethora [of] new perspectives on age-old metaphysical questions on determinism and the nature of reality. The main contention of this article is that the work of Gilbert Simondon - whose magnum opus possesses a scope uniting the most basic philosophical concerns with the most recent breakthroughs in natural sciences - is highly relevant (...) for an adequate understanding of the split between determinism and indeterminism, as well as the underlying presuppositions which have driven some influential contributions to this topic. To this end, the article shows that the more deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics offered by David Bohm and Louis de Broglie proves to be a valuable reference point for a more precise use and understanding of Simondon'ss transductive logic - especially when its philosophical lapses are considered closely. Finally, following the considerations of both thinkers, we aim at a more precise reconsideration of the stakes of indeterminism in modern physics, as well as a restructuration of what is often understood as a polarization. (shrink)

« La tradition a longtemps considéré l’homme comme une exception au sein de la nature, lui concédant le pouvoir de la dominer et le droit de l’exploiter à son avantage. Aujourd’hui, à l’inverse, l’homme n’occupe plus tant le sommet de l’ordre de la création que l’épicentre d’une catastrophe en cours. Une nouvelle innocence semble requise pour habiter plus harmonieusement la nature. Seulement, nous rencontrons ici un paradoxe, car c’est aussi l’ingénuité technique qui est chargée de surmonter la crise écologique. Dans (...) le présent texte, nous tenterons de dénouer ce paradoxe par le biais des Deux leçons sur l’animal et l’homme de Gilbert Simondon, en revenant sur deux motifs qui s’opposent seulement en apparence : d’un côté, la vision démiurgique de l’homme comme grand artisan, ancrée dans le mythe platonicien du Timée, et de l’autre, la vision axiologique et éthique de l’homme, rendue emblématique par le sermon aux oiseaux de Saint François d’Assise. L’importance de la légende de Saint François d’Assise pour le canon apocalyptique du xiii ème siècle nous permettra de relier cette vision éthique au mythe platonicien, nous amenant, au final, à suggérer une alternative aux visions apocalyptiques de l’Anthropocène, appuyée sur l’originalité de la conception de la nature dans la pensée simondonienne. ». (shrink)

A summary is provided of Ruyer's important contribution, also a reversal from some conclusions held in his secondary doctoral dissertation, about the limits inherent in technological progress, and an attempt is made to show the coherence of this position to Ruyer's metaphysics. Simondon's response is also presented, and subsequently analyzed especially as it culminates in a concept of concretizations. As Simondon indicated, and with a displacement in Ruyer's limitating framework on unconditional growth, we end up searching for what (...) represents the category of the ultimate for those two philosophers of the cyberworld. (shrink)

Introduction to a special issue of the journal entitled 'Gilbert Simondon: media and technics'.

This paper will examine the notion of information in the early cybernetics and in Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy. First, we will be outlining the notion of information of early (or first-order) cyberneticians. Secondly, we will summarize Simondon’s concept of information. Finally, the last part of the paper will be dealing shortly with the present understanding of information which has expanded since the beginning of the 20th century. -/- Presented at Doctoral Congress in Philosophy 22.–24.10.2018, University of Tampere, Finland.

Nous nous proposons dans cette intervention de structurer synchroniquement trois moments philosophiques d’origines differentes : l’intuition agissante chez Kitarō Nishida, la dialectique de la mediation absolue chez Hajime Tanabe et la philosophie de l’individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, dans un contexte de reflexion philosophique sur la nature de la vie humaine. Les trois moments semblent susceptibles de se croiser, se critiquer et se completer dans un terrain transductif au sens ou l’entend Simondon. C’est ce nouveau terrain que nous entendons (...) defricher afin d’ouvrir une perspective ou un individu humain se transforme en agent responsable d’un transhumanisme a travers le processus de l’individuation dynamique et transindividuelle, laquelle nous preparerait a l’emergence du posthumain dans un futur proche. (shrink)

El artículo se propone poner en relación las concepciones sobre lo viviente en las obras de Hans Jonas y Gilbert Simondon. Como principales puntos de convergencia entre los dos autores se destacan la intención por superar los dualismos que han marcado las discusiones sobre este tema y la consideración del carácter problemático de la existencia del ser vivo. En ambos casos, la tensión que surge de este ser problemático de lo viviente se revela como el resultado de su propio (...) devenir. Esta caracterización de lo viviente se da en el caso de Jonas mediante su concepción de libertad y, en el caso de Simondon, en su consideración de la vida como conservación de un estado metaestable. La comparación de estos dos autores se concentrará en tres aspectos: (1) la distinción entre lo viviente y lo no-vivo; (2) el rol de la afectividad en los seres vivos; y (3) la forma en la que es entendida la muerte. Finalmente se pondrá en relación estas concepciones sobre el fenómeno de la vida con sus implicancias ético-políticas. (shrink)

Il Corso su L’ermeneutica del soggetto problematizza un tema che attraversa sottotraccia l’intera riflessione di Foucault, quello della tecnica. L’articolo, proponendo un dialogo fra Foucault, Heidegger e Simondon, prova a rintracciare lo sviluppo di questo tema, chiedendosi inoltre in che modo la tecnica entri in relazione con i processi di assoggettamento e di soggettivazione.

It should now be recognized that codes are central to life and to understanding its more complex forms, including human culture. Recognizing the ‘conventional’ nature of codes provides solid grounds for rejecting efforts to reduce life to biochemistry and justifies according a place to semantics in life. The question I want to consider is whether this is enough. Focussing on Eigen’s paradox of how a complex code could originate, I will argue that along with Barbieri’s efforts to account for the (...) origins of life based on the ribosome and then to account for the refined codes through a process of ambiguity reduction, something more is required. Barbieri has not provided an adequate account of emergence, or the basis for providing such an account. I will argue that Stanley Salthe has clarified to some extent the nature of emergence by conceptualizing it as the interpolation of new enabling constraints. Clearly, codes can be seen as enabling constraints. How this actually happens, though, is still not explained. Stuart Kauffman has grappled with this issue and shown that it radically challenges the assumptions of mainstream science going back to Newton. He has attempted to reintroduce real possibilities or potentialities into his ontology, and argued that radically new developments in nature are associated with realizing adjacent possibles. This is still not adequate. What is also involved, I will suggest, utilizing concepts developed by the French natural philosopher Gilbert Simondon, is ‘transduction’ as part of ‘ontogenesis’ of individuals in a process of ‘individuation’, that is, the emergence of ‘individuals’ from preindividual fields or milieux. (shrink)

En este ensayo intentaremos realizar una pequeña aproximación al pensamiento de Gilbert Simondon, filósofo francés cuya obra podría resumirse en sus dos tesis doctorales defendidas en 1958, una de las cuales no fue publicada de forma completa sino póstumamente. No obstante, lo dicho, tras el creciente interés en su pensamiento comenzaron a publicarse ya nacido este milenio, en particular en Argentina, sus cursos sobre percepción, imaginación, invención, información, comunicación y tecnología. A pesar de su escueta obra, Simondon es (...) un filósofo de sistema, que a partir de su teoría de la individuación intentó fundar un monismo ontogenético en el cual puedan entrar en comunicación todas las disciplinas humanas; y para ello buscó explotar todos los recursos conceptuales que brindaron las revoluciones científicas de su época. En este ensayo, sin embargo, abordaremos tan sólo el tipo de realidad o estatus ontológico que Simondon atribuía a los objetos técnicos. Para ello desarrollaremos 4 apartados y un bis. En el primero, haremos un esbozo de lo que es el método filosófico propuesto por Simondon, el cual describimos como un paradigmatismo analógico. En el segundo, desarrollaremos algunas críticas a cierto paradigmatismo particular que, según Simondon, subyace en gran parte del pensamiento occidental y que nos impide, entre otras cosas, comprender la realidad propia de los OT, a saber: el hilemorfismo. En tercer lugar, analizaremos en qué medida podemos salvar la realidad de los OT de ser reducida a mero constructo social. En cuarto lugar; analizaremos algunas analogías y disparidades entre los OT y los seres vivientes. Por último, a modo de apéndice, expondremos sucintamente un artículo de Esperanza García y Villegas Jaraleño, presentado en el último volumen de Scientia in verba, en el cual se plantea la pregunta sobre el estatus ontológico de los artefactos biotecnológicos desde una perspectiva bungeana; así como pequeñas críticas y aportes que pudiésemos hacerle desde el pensamiento simondoniano. (shrink)

The concept of information and its relation to biosemiotics is a major area of contention among biosemioticians. Biosemioticians influenced by von Uexküll, Sebeok, Bateson and Peirce are critical of the way the concept as developed in information science has been applied to biology, while others believe that for biosemiotics to gain acceptance it will have to embrace information science and distance biosemiotics from Peirce’s philosophical work. Here I will defend the influence of Peirce on biosemiotics, arguing that information science and (...) biosemiotics as these were originally formulated are radically opposed research traditions. Failure to appreciate this will undermine the challenge of biosemiotics and other anti-reductionist traditions to mainstream science with its reductionist ambition to explain everything through physics. However, for this challenge to be successful, it will be necessary to respond to criticisms of Peircian ideas, jettisoning ideas that are no longer defensible and integrating ideas allied to his anti-reductionist agenda. Here I will argue that the natural philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, offering a searching critique of the application of the new concept of information and cybernetics to the life and human sciences, provides the means to defend and advance Peirce’s core ideas and thereby defend post-reductionist biosemiotics. (shrink)

In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This (...) paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog). (shrink)

[DRAFT] Paper presented at Congress for Doctoral Researchers in Philosophy, Tampere University, 25.–27.10. 2021. The Paper strives to flesh out Gilbert Simondon's notion of information as a multifaced process (transduction-modulation-organization) from the viewpoint of living (/biological) beings.

En el presente trabajo expondré lo que considero uno de los problemas centrales en la filosofía spinoziana, la cual es una temática que ha atravesado a gran parte de los pensadores occidentales pero que, a partir del filósofo holandes, tuvo un desarrollo particular con una visión renovadora, siendo herederos de ésta pensadores de la talla de Gilles Deleuze, o Gilbert Simondon. Hago referencia a la noción de individuación, sus procesos generadores, y la importancia que en ella tiene el concepto (...) de conatus, desarrollado por Spinoza. (shrink)

Amid the wide variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics, the notion of a fully coherent ontological interpretation has seen a promising evolution over the last few decades. Despite this progress, however, the old dualistic categorical constraints of subjectivity and objectivity, correlate with the metrically restricted definition of local and global, have remained largely in place – a reflection of the broader, persistent inheritance of these comfortable strictures throughout the evolution of modern science. If one traces this inheritance back to its (...) ancient roots in Plato and Aristotle, it is clear that the coherence, scientific utility, and historical durability of the various natural philosophies that followed have been directly proportional to their commitment, tacit or explicit, to object-oriented realism. As Simondon might put it, it is a commitment to the primacy of individuated substance over the process of individuation. For Whitehead, it is the misplaced assimilation of becoming to being, of potentiality to actuality. Quantum mechanics has challenged this commitment with a combined breadth and depth of force that far exceeds any other theory in the history of science. The theory’s objectively demonstrable empirical application is manifest only by way of a fundamentally subjective, context-dependent mechanism of measurement. More compelling still, actual system states are always actualizations of locally contextualized yet globally conditioned potential system states, such that “globally objective” reality is no longer merely the object of local measurement, but also its product. Thus, any coherent, ontological interpretation of quantum theory must include a conceptual framework by which objectivity and subjectivity, actuality and potentiality, global and local, being and becoming, individuated fact and process of individuation, are no longer understood as merely epistemic, mutually exclusive category pairs descriptive of an already extant, closed reality – but rather as mutually implicative ontological categories explicative of an ontogenetic, open reality-in-process. (shrink)

The eminent French biologist and historian of biology, François Jacob, once notoriously declared “On n’interroge plus la vie dans les laboratoires”: laboratory research no longer inquires into the notion of ‘Life’. Nowadays, as David Hull puts it, “both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for granted… Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that.” In the mid-twentieth century, from the immediate post-war period to the late 1960s, French philosophers of science such as Georges Canguilhem, Raymond Ruyer and Gilbert (...) class='Hi'>Simondon returned to Jacob’s statement with an odd kind of pathos: they were determined to reverse course. Not by imposing a different kind of research program in laboratories, but by an unusual combination of historical and philosophical inquiry into the foundations of the life sciences (particularly medicine, physiology and the cluster of activities that were termed ‘biology’ in the early 1800s). Even in as straightforwardly scholarly a work as La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (1955), Canguilhem speaks oddly of “defending vitalist biology,” and declares that Life cannot be grasped by logic (or at least, “la vie déconcerte la logique”). Was all this historical and philosophical work merely a reassertion of ‘mysterian’, magical vitalism? In order to answer this question we need to achieve some perspective on Canguilhem’s ‘vitalism’, notably with respect to its philosophical influences such as Kurt Goldstein. (shrink)

Beginning with a survey of the shortcoming of theories of organology/media-as-externalization of mind/body—a philosophical-anthropological tradition that stretches from Plato through Ernst Kapp and finds its contemporary proponent in Bernard Stiegler—I propose that the phenomenological treatment of media as an outpouching and extension of mind qua intentionality is not sufficient to counter the ̳black-box‘ mystification of today‘s deep learning‘s algorithms. Focusing on a close study of Simondon‘s On the Existence of Technical Objectsand Individuation, I argue that the process-philosophical work of (...) Gilbert Simondon, with its critique of Norbert Wiener‘s first-order cybernetics, offers a precursor to the conception of second-order cybernetics (as endorsed byFrancisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, and Ricardo B. Uribe) and, specifically, its autopoietic treatment of information. It has been argued by those such as Frank Pasquale that neuro-inferential deep learning systems premised on predictive patterning, suchas AlphaGo Zero, have a veiled logic and, thus, are ̳black boxes‘. In detailing a philosophical-historical approach to demystify predictive patterning/processing and the logic of such deep learning algorithms, this paper attempts to shine a light on such systems and their inner workingsàla Simondon. (shrink)

In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as (...) philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.). (shrink)

I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. -/- I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of (...) difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. -/- A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, and Bergsonism — Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. -/- Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation. -/- Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works. (shrink)

As a philosophical paradigm, differential heterogenesis offers us a novel descriptive vantage with which to inscribe Deleuze’s virtuality within the terrain of “differential becoming,” conjugating “pure saliences” so as to parse economies, microhistories, insurgencies, and epistemological evolutionary processes that can be conceived of independently from their representational form. Unlike Gestalt theory’s oppositional constructions, the advantage of this aperture is that it posits a dynamic context to both media and its analysis, rendering them functionally tractable and set in relation to other (...) objects, rather than as sedentary identities. Surveying the genealogy of differential heterogenesis with particular interest in the legacy of Lautman’s dialectic, I make the case for a reading of the Deleuzean virtual that departs from an event-oriented approach, galvanizing Sarti and Citti’s dynamic a priori vis-à-vis Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Specifically, I posit differential heterogenesis as frame with which to examine our contemporaneous epistemic shift as it relates to multi-scalar computational modeling while paying particular attention to neuro-inferential modes of inductive learning and homologous cognitive architecture. Carving a bricolage between Mark Wilson’s work on the “greediness of scales” and Deleuze’s “scales of reality”, this project threads between static ecologies and active externalism vis-à-vis endocentric frames of reference and syntactical scaffolding. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben's Creation and Anarchy is comprised of five meditative essays compiled over the last few years and presented as an anthologized collection. The initial few chapters' survey postmodern art qua divinity, with particular interest to a contradictory dialectic: inspiration and critique. Drawing from an idiosyncratic amalgam of thinkers–ranging from bastion thinkers such as Kant and Heidegger to zoologist Jacob von Ueküll and prescient media philosopher Gilbert Simondon–Agamben carves a historiographic lineage between politics, animal studies, landscape painting, and religion.

Citation:Christodoulou, Marina. “Technopolis as the Technologised Kingdom of God. Fun as Technology, Technology as Religion in the 21st Century. God sive Fun.” Cahiers d'études germaniques N° 74, 2018. La religion au XXIe siècle - Perpectives et enjeux de la discussion autour d'une société post-séculière. Études reunites par Sébastian Hüsch et Max Marcuzzi, 119-132. -/- -------- -/- Neil Postman starts his book Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (1993)1 with a quote from Paul Goodman’s New Reformation: “Whether or not it (...) draws on new scientific research, technology is a branch of moral philosophy, not of science.” (Postman 1993: motto; Goodman 2010: 40). I would extend Postman’s Technopoly to Technopolis, to give it more of a presence in time and space. Hence, I will use the term Technopoly when I am referring to Postman; the term Technopolis is my own. -/- In his book From Faith to Fun: The Secularisation of Humour, Russel Heddendorf argues that humour is a technology (Heddendorf 2009: 32-34), as it is understood and theorized by Neil Postman in Technopoly. Russel Heddendorf also argues that “Technopoly” is a term correlated with Wittgenstein’s use of the term “worldview” (Weltanschauung) (Heddendorf 2009: 11). -/- I would like to draw on these thoughts to propose that Technopoly (or Technopolis) could be the secularized Kingdom of God, namely that Technology is the Religion of the 21st century, and that Fun is a paradigm of such a Technology / Technique. God is yet another technique or Technology of and in Technopoly. -/- The godless individual in the 21st century, I will argue, is as much a believer as the faithful in the Sacred Religion (term used in opposition to Secular or rather Technological or Technologized Religion, which is Fun). He believes in Fun (as a post-modern form of pleasure), as much as the believer believes, or more accurately, believed in God. In the 21st century, the faithful in Sacred Religion believes in a fun God, as opposed to the serious God of the past. Fun is turning into the Technologized Religion for all; for the faithful in Godly / Sacred Religion, as well for as the unfaithful. Fun (pleasure, humour) is the definitive qualia of 21st century pleasure. The mechanics of Fun make it absolutely functional for controlling people; as Aldous Huxley wrote in Brave New World, people “are controlled by inflicting pleasure” (cited in Heddendorf 2009: 158). Now, indulging in pleasure is having Fun. In the 21st century, nobody is unfaithful, nobody disputes God, because God has been manufactured into Fun. We are living in the most religious century of all. -/- The commodity of God, now inextricably blended into work and leisure ethics and culture, is as unavoidable as survival. You don’t work, you don’t survive, you don’t exist. You work, you are entitled to leisure, or free time – the time (“busy-time”) when you are busy is work. The free time of leisure (“fun-time”) is a time for fun (pleasure). The time dedicated to Fun is culturally (capitalistically) pre-defined; no moment is actually free, each moment that is sold as free is to be bought with Work Time tokens –which is money. Believe is Enjoy. Happiness, achieved through pleasure, and pleasure through Fun, and Life as Play, is the recipe for Teleology in the 21st century. -/- The Technological God (Fun), as the Sacred God before him, is sovereignty’s technique or a social “mode of release”: demonstrations, marches, petitions, freedom of speech, citizen and human rights vindications, are “modes of release”, so that the next day, feeling relieved and released that you are working for a better life and a better world, you can wake up cheerfully to walk to your workplace, feeling it will change because of your marching, or your petition, or your speech, or the mass you attended, or the prayer you said yesterday. Thus life continues unchanging, through postponing hope; the tension of the tragedy is always released (lysis) in catharsis: refreshment for the next day of work. Art, especially cinema, (namely, simulated life) follows the same cathartic principles as real life. Thus, you can keep coping, and hoping in the meantime is of much help. Religion, Art, Science, Therapy, and Technology are all technologies used to market life, sell it or lend it, and humans are buying it back. Fun is free to produce, and expensive to buy. (shrink)

Value can be understood, analyzed, and created in various ways. In addition to more pragmatic modes of valorization, there are “ontological” processes that can be understood to increase value, which will refer as ontological valorization and progressively unpack. Ontological valorization generally works as a foundation for pragmatic valorization. David Graeber has pointed out that value rises out of a system of relations, and this is the level of ontological valorization. In this chapter, the authors explore ontological valorization for possibilities of (...) transformation at this foundational level. They explore the possibilities represented by blockchain technologies for both ontological and pragmatic valorization. The authors argue and try to show that, even with its present-day limitations and problems, the technology's innovativeness lies in its ability to create a foundation for ontological valorization, though not necessarily in certain practical applications per se. (shrink)

In response to suggestions that Deleuze and Guattari are the “enemy” of companion species, this essay explores the tension between Donna Haraway’s attacks against Deleuze and Guattari and their philosophy of becoming animal. The essay goes on to contextualize Deleuze and Guattari’s statements against pet-owners through a discussion of the psychoanalytical refiguration of desire and shows how their ostensible attack against pet owners fits into their larger critique against capitalism. The essay illustrates why Deleuze and Guattari and Haraway are more (...) in agreement than first meets the eye, finding commensurability through Haraway’s early work on embryology. Becoming animal does not begin and end with either humans or animals and the essay explores the high stakes of focusing on intensities rather than actual animal bodies. (shrink)

Drawing on Adorno and Horkheimer's oft-quoted 1944 essay, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” Bernard Stiegler’s The Age of Disruption affirms that the Frankfurt School duo scrupulously envisaged a “new kind of barbarism,” or an inversion of modernity’s Enlightenment project illustrated by our contemporary political semblance. Surveying the critical social fissures that index contemporary Western civil society—from 9/11 to the 2002 Nanterre massacre and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting—Stiegler diagnoses that our epoch is plagued by the “absence of epoch,” (...) whereby computational capitalism and algorithmic governmentality have extirpated the “transcendental imagination” underlying vital primordial narcissism. In short, these are symptoms a world increasingly “going mad,” in a thousand ways, possible because we are the bearers of “a negative protention of a becoming without future,” yet “we prefer not to say so: we do not want to know about it.”. (shrink)