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  1. Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of (...)
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  2. Naming the concept horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for this (...)
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  3. Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy, [edited] by José L.Zalabardo. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, viii + 274 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-969152-4 £31.50. [REVIEW]Michael Price - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (S1):e9-e14.
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