The Schwarzschild solution (Schwarzschild, 1915/16) to Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR) is accepted in theoretical physics as the unique solution to GTR for a central-mass system. In this paper I propose an alternative solution to GTR, and argue it is both logically consistent and empirically realistic as a theory of gravity. This solution is here called K-gravity. The introduction explains the basic concept. The central sections go through the technical detail, defining the basic solution for the geometric tensor, the (...) Christoffel symbols, Ricci tensor, Ricci scalar, Einstein tensor, stress-energy tensor and density-pressure for the system. The density is integrated, and some consistency properties are demonstrated. A notable feature is the disappearance of the event horizon singularity, i.e. there are no black holes. So far this is for a single central mass. A generalization of the solution for multiple masses is then proposed. This is required to support K-gravity as a viable general interpretation of gravity. Then the question of empirical tests is discussed. It is argued that current observational data is almost but not quite sufficient to verify or falsify K-gravity. The Pioneer spacecraft trajectory data is of particular interest, as this is capable of providing a test; but the data (which originally showed anomalies that match K-gravity) is now uncertain. A new and very practical experiment is proposed to settle the matter. This would provide a novel test of GTR, and a novel test of the cause of the Pioneer anomalies. In conclusion, K-gravity has extensive ramifications for gravitational physics and for the philosophy of GTR and space-time. (shrink)

Physicists routinely claim that the fundamental laws of physics are 'time symmetric' or 'time reversal invariant' or 'reversible'. In particular, it is claimed that the theory of quantum mechanics is time symmetric. But it is shown in this paper that the orthodox analysis suffers from a fatal conceptual error, because the logical criterion for judging the time symmetry of probabilistic theories has been incorrectly formulated. The correct criterion requires symmetry between future-directed laws and past-directed laws. This criterion is formulated and (...) proved in detail. The orthodox claim that quantum mechanics is reversible is re-evaluated. The property demonstrated in the orthodox analysis is shown to be quite distinct from time reversal invariance. The view of Satosi Watanabe that quantum mechanics is time asymmetric is verified, as well as his view that this feature does not merely show a de facto or 'contingent' asymmetry, as commonly supposed, but implies a genuine failure of time reversal invariance of the laws of quantum mechanics. The laws of quantum mechanics would be incompatible with a time-reversed version of our universe. (shrink)

Introduction to alternative ontology of mind and physics based on the multi-dimensional model of A Geometric Theory of the Universe (Holster).

This is a summary presentation of TAU, a theory proposed to explain relativity and unify physics. It is a radical change, because it proposes six dimensions of space, instead of the usual three (normal physics) or nine (string theory). It starts with an alternative foundation for Special Relativity, and leads to a unified theory of physics. It is a realist theory because it is realist about space and time. The TAU concept is briefly introduced here, and its results explained in (...) three main areas, particles, gravity and cosmology. In these areas it makes strong predictions and has several tests. This presentation is based around these applications and the key questions of completing a full particle model, and completing tests of gravity and tests of cosmology. These will decide its fate as an empirical theory. The aim here is to give an overview, in reasonable detail for generalists to see how the model works, but with a minimum of theoretical derivations, so we do not get too bogged down in equations. There are a lot of illustrations instead. Please note this is only a survey of the theory, and a more detailed introduction with proofs follows in Chapters 2-6, where it is developed in stages. In the first half here, we go quickly over the main concepts, in the second half, we give some equations for cosmology and gravity solutions in more detail, because they are more novel. (shrink)

The analysis of the reversibility of quantum mechanics depends upon the choice of the time reversal operator for quantum mechanical states. The orthodox choice for the time reversal operator on QM states is known as the Wigner operator, T*, where * performs complex conjugation. The peculiarity is that this is not simply the unitary time reversal operation, but an anti-unitary operator, involving complex conjugation in addition to ordinary time reversal. The alternative choice is the Racah operator, which is simply ordinary (...) time reversal, T. Orthodox treatments hold that it is either logically or empirically necessary to adopt the Wigner operator, and the Racah operator has received little attention. The basis for this choice is analysed in detail, and it is concluded that all the conventional arguments for rejecting the Racah operator and adopting the Wigner operator are mistaken. The additional problem of whether the deterministic part of quantum mechanics should be judged to be reversible or not is also considered. The adoption of the Racah operator for time reversal appears prima facie to entail that quantum mechanics is irreversible. However, it is concluded that the real answer to question depends upon the choice of interpretation of the theory. In any case, the conventional reasons for claiming that quantum mechanics is reversible are incorrect. (shrink)

This is Part 2 of a four part paper, intended as an introduction to the key concepts and issues of time directionality for physicists and philosophers. It redresses some fundamental confusions in the subject. These need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics and philosophy of physics students. Here we analyze the quantum mechanical time reversal operator and the reversal of the deterministic Schrodinger equation. It is argued that quantum mechanics is anti-symmetric w.r.t. time reversal in its deterministic laws. (...) This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric (reversible), and that we must adopt the anti-unitary operator (T*) instead of the unitary time reversal operator (T) for time reversal in quantum mechanics. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large metaphysical conclusions about the symmetry of time are drawn from it. But it is an error. (shrink)

This is Part 1 of a four part paper, intended to redress some of the most fundamental confusions in the subject of physical time directionality, and represent the concepts accurately. There are widespread fallacies in the subject that need to be corrected in introductory courses for physics students and philosophers. We start in Part 1 by analysing the time reversal symmetry of quantum probability laws. Time reversal symmetry is defined as the property of invariance under the time reversal transformation, T: (...) t --> -t. It is shown that quantum mechanics (classical or relativistic) is strongly time asymmetric in its probability laws. This contradicts the orthodox analysis, found throughout the conventional literature on physical time, which claims that quantum mechanics is time symmetric or reversible. This is widely claimed as settled scientific fact, and large philosophical and scientific conclusions are drawn from it. But it is an error. The fact is that while quantum mechanics is widely claimed to be reversible on the basis of two formal mathematical properties (that it does have), these properties do not represent invariance under the time reversal transformation. A recent experiment (Batalhão at alia, 2015) showing irreversibility of quantum thermodynamics is discussed as an illustration of this result. Most physicists remain unaware of the errors, decades after they were first demonstrated. Orthodox specialists in the philosophy of time who are aware of the error continue to refer to the ‘time symmetry’ or ‘reversibility’ of quantum mechanics anyway – and exploit the ambiguity to claim false implications about physical time reversal symmetry in nature. The excuse for perpetrating the confusion is that, since it is has now become customary to refer to the formal properties of quantum mechanics as ‘reversibility’ or ‘time reversal symmetry’, we should just keep referring to them by this name, even though they are not time reversal symmetry. This causes endless confusion, in attempts to explain the physical irreversibility of our universe, and in philosophical discussions of implications of physics for the nature of time. The failure of genuine time reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics changes the interpretation of modern physics in a deep way. It changes the problem of explaining the real irreversibility found throughout nature. (shrink)

CAT4 is proposed as a general method for representing information, enabling a powerful programming method for large-scale information systems. It enables generalised machine learning, software automation and novel AI capabilities. It is based on a special type of relation called CAT4, which is interpreted to provide a semantic representation. This is Part 2 of a five-part introduction. The focus here is on defining key mathematical properties of CAT2, identifying the topology and defining essential functions over a coordinate system. The analysis (...) is from first principles. This develops on from the axioms introduced in Part 1. The interpretation of fact networks is introduced in Part 3, and the full application to semantic theory comes in Part 4, where we introduce general functions, including the language interpretation or linguistic functions. In Part 5, we turn to software design considerations, to show how files, indexes, functions and screens can be defined to implement a CAT4 system efficiently. (shrink)

CAT4 is proposed as a general method for representing information, enabling a powerful programming method for large-scale information systems. It enables generalised machine learning, software automation and novel AI capabilities. It is based on a special type of relation called CAT4, which is interpreted to provide a semantic representation. This is Part 1 of a five-part introduction. The focus here is on defining the key mathematical structures first, and presenting the semantic-database application in subsequent Parts. We focus in Part 1 (...) on general axioms for the structures, and introduce key concepts. Part 2 analyses the CAT2 sub-relation of CAT4 in more detail. The interpretation of fact networks is introduced in Part 3, where we turn to interpreting semantics. We start with examples of relational and graph databases, with methods to translate them into CAT3 networks, with the aim of retaining the meaning of information. The full application to semantic theory comes in Part 4, where we introduce general functions, including the language interpretation or linguistic functions. The representation of linear symbolic languages, including natural languages and formal symbolic languages, is a function that CAT4 is uniquely suited to. In Part 5, we turn to software design considerations, to show how files, indexes, functions and screens can be defined to implement a CAT4 system efficiently. (shrink)

CAT4 is proposed as a general method for representing information, enabling a powerful programming method for large-scale information systems. It enables generalised machine learning, software automation and novel AI capabilities. This is Part 3 of a five-part introduction. The focus here is on explaining the semantic model for CAT4. Points in CAT4 graphs represent facts. We introduce all the formal (data) elements used in the classic semantic model: sense or intension (1st and 2nd joins), reference (3rd join), functions (4th join), (...) time and truth (logical fields), and symbolic content (name/value fields). Concepts are introduced through examples alternating with theoretical discussion. Some concepts are assumed from Part 1 and 2, but key ideas are re-introduced. The purpose is to explain the CAT4 interpretation, and why the data structure and CAT4 axioms have been chosen: to make the semantic model consistent and complete. We start with methods to translate information from database tables into graph DBs and into CAT4. We conclude with a method for translating natural language into CAT4. We conclude with a comparison of the system with an advanced semantic logic, the hyper-intensional logic TIL, which also aims to translate NL into a logical calculus. The CAT4 Natural Language Translator is discussed in further detail in Part 4, when we introduce functions more formally. Part 5 discusses software design considerations. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in understanding the nature of time is explaining its directionality. This 1990 PhD thesis re-examines the concepts of time flow, the physical directionality of time, and the semantics of tensed language. Several novel results are argued for that contradict the orthodox anti-realist views still dominant in the subject. Specifically, the concept of "metaphysical time flow" is supported as a valid scientific concept, and argued to be intrinsic to the directionality of objective probabilities in quantum mechanics; the common (...) claims that quantum probability theory is time reversible is shown to be based on an analytic error, stemming from a false choice for the criterion for reversibility of probabilistic theories (recognized by Satosi Watanabe in the 1950s but ignored in all philosophical discussions); and a consistent semantics for tensed language (adapted from the tree model of Storrs McCall) is constructed, showing that the common rejection of "time flow" as having no meaningful semantics is false. These debates are still ongoing in almost exactly the same state they were pre-1990, and there is appears to be no visible progress in the subject. Critical points made against errors in the orthodox account (which has been sustained for 70 years by the anti-realist philosophy of time, typified by the "Pittsburg School" of Grunbaum-Earman-Norton-Roberts), are still not recognized in the philosophy of time or physics. Some key technical proofs in this thesis have been published in physics proper. See p.ii-iii for full original abstract. (This pdf is uploaded from the Massey University archive.). (shrink)

Kriegel described the problem of intentional inexistence as one of the ‘perennial problems of philosophy’, 307–340, 2007: 307). In the same paper, Kriegel alluded to a modal realist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, Kriegel does not state by name who defends the kind of modal realist solution he has in mind. Kriegel also points out that even what he believes to be the strongest version of modal realism does not pass the ‘principle of representation’ and thus modal (...) realism is not an adequate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. In this paper, I respond to Kriegel by defending a modal realist solution that he did not consider in 2007, called ‘extended modal realism’. EMR is a version of modal realism where possible worlds are not completely isolated as they are under the Lewisian model. Rather, under EMR worlds are, in a way, spatiotemporally related. The fact EMR worlds are related allows EMR to sufficiently pass the principle of representation and thus can be deemed a legitimate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. I conclude that either EMR can pass the principle of representation in some cases or, and I think the more sensible option, we give up on the principle of representation altogether. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Goff's view that universal consciousness grounds logical laws such as the law of non-contradiction cannot be true on the grounds that we cannot guarantee the classical logic loving nature of universal consciousness that Goff desires in order to ground logical laws. I will present three arguments to show this.

This paper walks through four different approaches to Hegel's notion of Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Through taking four different approaches our aim is to explore the multifaceted nature of the phenomenological movement of consciousness. The first part provides an overview of the three chapters of the section on Consciousness, namely Sense-Certainty, Perception and Force and the Understanding, attempting to unearth the implicit logic that undergirds Consciousness’ experience. The second part focuses specifically on the shape of Sense-Certainty, providing an (...) analysis of the movement from Sense-Certainty to Perception from a neuroscientific view. Thirdly, we consider an inferentialist reading of the chapters on Consciousness which has been made popular by Robert Brandom. We think that while this view elucidates the connection that Hegel draws between meaning and use, it fails to account for the vital place of immediacy in each of the shapes. Finally, the fourth part suggests that Hegel’s notion of Consciousness improves the reading of tragedy he develops in chapters 5 and 7 of the Phenomenology. While many critics have noted that Hegel fails to do justice to tragic experience, Consciousness contains an epistemology that develops analogously to the heroes of ancient tragedy. Each approach in this paper comes at Hegel’s description of the journey of Consciousness from a different angle, and together they paint a multi-layered picture of a highly important part of Hegel’s corpus. (shrink)

Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), historians and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the implications of disciplinarity. In this chapter we consider restrictions posed to interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics that result from a particular kind of commitment to the ideal of disciplinary purity, that is, that each discipline is defined by an appropriate, unique set of objects, methods, theories, and aims. We argue that, when it comes to the objects of study (...) in ecology and economics, ideas of disciplinary purity have been underwritten by the artificial-natural distinction. We then problematize this distinction, and thus disciplinary purity, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the distinction is no longer tenable. Empirically, recent interdisciplinary research has shown the epistemological and policy-oriented benefits of dealing with models which explicitly link anthropogenic (i.e., “artificial”) and non-anthropogenic factors (i.e., “natural”). We conclude that, in the current age of the Anthropocene, it is to be expected that without interdisciplinary exchange, ecology and economics may relinquish global relevance because the distinct and separate systems to which each “pure” science was originally made to apply will only diminish over time. (shrink)

The birth of a new science is long, drawn out, and often fairly messy. Comparative psychology has its roots in Darwin’s Descent of Man, was fertilized in academic psychology departments, and has branched across the universities into departments of biology, anthropology, primatology, zoology, and philosophy. Both the insights and the failings of comparative psychology are making their way into contemporary discussions of artificial intelligence and machine learning (Chollett 2019; Lapuschkin et al. 2019; Watson 2019). It is the right time to (...) turn a philosophical lens onto the methodologies of comparative psychology. That is the aim of this Element. -/- Comparative psychology is the umbrella covering the different ways scientists study animal mind and behavior. Comparative psychologists study animal behavior and mentality, including the mechanisms and inner states that allow crows to form hooks, vervet monkeys to give warnings, crabs to make trade-off decisions, and humans to use language. While focus is on the similarities and differences between different species, capacities are often studied in terms of their evolutionary history, development, and current ecological or cultural context. What this entails is that comparative psychologists have a range of different kinds of training, different areas of expertise, and different research questions. One comparative cognition researcher compares children and dogs on causal reasoning abilities (Daphna Buchsbaum), another looks at memory in corvids (Nicola Clayton). An animal behaviorist examines raccoon territories in a city (Suzanne MacDonald). One anthropologist looks at war in wild chimpanzees (John Mitani), another looks at how innovations are adopted in capu- chin monkeys (Susan Perry). One ethologist looks at play in wolves (Marc Bekoff), and another looks at deception in birds (Carolyn Ristau). One biologist looks at male alliances in dolphins (Richard Connor), and another examines economic game performance in apes and monkeys (Sarah Brosnan). An animal welfare scientist studies the effect of enrichment on mink (Georgia Mason). A learning theorist looks at gambling in pigeons (Thomas Zentall). A zoologist studies social learning in bees (Lars Chittka). It is not easy to guess in which department you’ll find a comparative psychologist. -/- This Element aims to examine the methods of comparative psychology, which remains especially concerned about how to study animal minds and behavior without falling prey to fuzzy thinking. Animals can be cute, so humans are often intrinsically drawn to them; and this love of animals is sometimes taken to be at odds with being a careful scientist. The methods of comparative psychology reflect this worry with their special emphases on avoiding bias and on avoiding developing warm relationships with animal subjects. The first two sections analyze three textbooks to examine what young scientists are taught. Section 1 investigates three methodological principles students are taught to follow: Anti-anthropomorphism, Morgan’s Canon, and Anti-anthropocentrism. I argue that the first two principles should be discarded, and that developing relationships with animals should no longer be discouraged, as relationships promote understanding. Building on this critique, in Section 2 I challenge the common prohibition against including animal consciousness in comparative psychology by arguing that it does not harm the science, but promotes it. Setting aside the special prohibitions for comparative psychology, in Section 3 I examine how the quest for objectivity in comparative psychology introduces its own bias and argue that the different disciplines of comparative psychology will introduce different biases; the best scientists can do is identify the sources of bias. The quest to eliminate all bias is a misguided one. Section 4 applies these issues to recent debates in ape cognition research between scientists who work in the field and those who work in the lab, and suggests best practices for integrating knowledge from both sources. -/- I have had the opportunity to work with a number of comparative psychologists in a variety of contexts, including a stint at Lou Herman’s dolphin communication lab in the 1990s, collaborative studies with Peter Verbeek on the child’s theory of mind at the University of Minnesota’s Institute for Child Development, conducting research on orangutan pantomime communication with Anne Russon at her field sites in Borneo, research on rat social learning with Noam Miller at Wilfrid Laurier University, and co-teaching a field course in dolphin communication with Kathleen Dudzinski. As a philosopher of science who has been in the field and in the lab, I have a perspective from which to compare the comparative psychologists. This Element is my attempt to synthesize almost thirty years of experience and thinking about how to study animal minds. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of "objective phenomenology," or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...) objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. (shrink)

The guilt left by immoral actions is why moral duties are more pressing and serious than other reasons like prudential considerations. Religions talk of sin and karma; the secular still speak of spots or stains. I argue that a moral staining view of guilt is in fact the best model. It accounts for guilt's reflexive character and for anxious, scrupulous worries about whether one has transgressed. To understand moral staining, I borrow Christine Korsgaard's view that we construct our identities as (...) agents through our actions. The contribution of immoral actions to self-constitution explains why moral obligations have priority and importance. (shrink)

Discussion of Thomas Kuhn's remarks about paradigms.

I develop the conjecture that “naturalism” in philosophy names not a thesis but a paradigm in something like Thomas Kuhn’s sense, i.e., a set of commitments, shared by a group of investigators, whose acceptance by the members of the group powerfully influences their day-to-day investigative practice. I take a stab at spelling out the shared commitments that make up naturalism, and the logical and evidential relations among them.

In diesem Beitrag liefere ich eine Interpretation und Verteidigung der These Thomas Kuhns von der Priorität von Paradigmen. Ich behaupte, daß Kuhns Argument für diese These wichtiger, als gewöhnlich angenommen wird, ist, und zwar sowohl für die Klärung seiner Ideen als auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie im allgemeinen. Anerkennt man seine Kritik an der üblichen Auffassung, daß Regeln den Paradigmen vorausgehen, so erscheint vieles von dem, was er über andere Gegenstände sagt, in einem neuen Licht, und viele Schwierigkeiten, die Philosophen (...) bei ihren Versuchen zur Erklärung des Wissenschaftswandels angetroffen haben, erweisen sich als unbegründet. (shrink)

The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...) Thomas Crisp is also defective. I conclude by presenting my own suggestion as to how the account can be made less vulnerable to counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal (modulo a few details) could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well. -/- . (shrink)

It is often claimed that liberalism is falsely and perniciously universalist. I take this charge seriously, exploring three positions: the communitarians’, Rorty’s, and that of “comprehensive” liberalism. After explaining why universalism is thought impossible, I examine the communitarian view that value is determined within communities and argue that it results in a form of relativism that is unacceptable. I next discuss Richard Rorty’s liberal acceptance of “conventionalism” and explain how, despite his rejection of universalism, Rorty remains a liberal. I then (...) present a defense of universalism, based in part on arguments that parallel Thomas Nagel’s arguments in defense of a “view from nowhere” and Jean Hampton’s objectivist arguments against Rawls’s moves to a “merely political” theory. That defense requires that we can distance ourselves from our ends to make moral judgments shorn of all partialities. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to show that Thomas Aquinas, in his _Disputed Questions on Evil_, presents a theory of free will that is compatibilist but still involves a version of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and even requires alternative possibilities for a certain kind of responsibility. In Aquinas’ view, choosing between possibilities is not the primary power of the will. Rather, choice arises through the complex interaction of various parts of human psychology, in particular through the (...) indeterminacy of the intellect and through the interaction between reason and passion. Both of these ways provide cases where Aquinas not only allows for alternative possibilities but thinks that they are necessary for moral responsibility, all the while remaining, strictly speaking, a compatibilist. (shrink)

This critical study takes Nagel's book to task for its obscurity, and for its under-argued rejection of naturalism.

Review of T. Nickles (ed), Scientific Discovery: Case Studies.

We discuss the view that a hole is identical to the region of spacetime at which it is located. This view is more parsimonious than the view that holes are sui generis entities located at those regions surrounded by their hosts and it is more plausible than the view that there are no holes. We defend the spacetime view from several objections.

Despite his impressive influence on nineteenth-century philosophy, F. A. Trendelenburg's own philosophy has been largely ignored. However, among Kant scholars, Trendelenburg has always been remembered for his feud with Kuno Fischer over the subjectivity of space and time in Kant's philosophy. The topic of the dispute, now frequently referred to as the ?Neglected Alternative? objection, has become a prominent issue in contemporary discussions and interpretations of Kant's view of space and time. The Neglected Alternative contends that Kant unjustifiably moves from (...) the claim that we have a priori intuitions of space and time to the sceptical conclusion that space and time are exclusively subjective. Most current discussions trace the objection back to Trendelenburg and often use him to motivate the objection. However, to date Trendelenburg's actual arguments and reasons for rejecting the Kantian view of space and time have not been sufficiently uncovered; my goal here is to fill this lacuna. By better understanding what Trendelenburg actually argued, we will be in a better position to assess whether the Neglected Alternative objection against Kant is successful. But in addition, Trendelenburg's own system is of independent philosophical interest, and my work here will shed light on one part of it. (shrink)

Kant holds that in order to have knowledge of an object, a subject must be able to “prove” that the object is really possible—i.e., prove that there is neither logical inconsistency nor “real repugnance” between its properties. This is (usually) easy to do with respect to empirical objects, but (usually) impossible to do with respect to particular things-in-themselves. In the first section of the paper I argue that an important predecessor of Kant’s account of our ignorance of real possibility can (...) be found in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In the middle sections I discuss the way in which our inability to prove the real possibility of things-in-themselves motivates Kant’s famous prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge-claims about them. In the final section I examine Hegel’s attempts to dissolve this problem of real repugnance and thereby remove an inherited obstacle to speculative knowledge of the supersensible. -/- . (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a (...) similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy. (shrink)

This essay introduces a special issue focused on 4E cognition (cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) in the Lower Palaeolithic. In it, we review the typological and representational cognitive approaches that have dominated the past fifty years of paleoanthropology. These have assumed that all representations and computations take place only inside the head, which implies that the archaeological record can only be an “external” product or the behavioral trace of “internal” representational and computational processes. In comparison, the 4E approach (...) helps us to overcome this dualist representational logic, allowing us to engage directly with the archaeological record as an integral part of the thinking process, and thus ground a more parsimonious cognitive archaeology. It also treats stone tools, the primary vestiges of hominin thinking, as active participants in mental life. The 4E approach offers a better grounding for understanding hominin technical expertise, a crucially important component of hominin cognitive evolution. (shrink)

Part of a group commentary on Kant's Religion book. This chapter focuses on Part 2, section 2 on "The Evil Principle's Rightful Claim to Dominion over the Human Being, and the Struggle of the Two Principles with One Another" -/- .

This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion (...) of standard accounts of both kinds of trust and criticises especially the standard accounts of non-evidential trust. A new account of non-evidential trust is offered that avoids a number of difficulties that plague the standard accounts by rejecting what we call ‘attitude-liability assumptions’. (shrink)

Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to argumentation. Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. A first attempt is made at a survey of argumentational virtues, and finally it is argued that the dialectical nature of argumentation makes it particularly suited for virtue theoretic analysis.

David Ekdahl (2023), in a constructive and thoughtful commentary, outlines both points of agreement with and suggestions for further research arising from our paper ‘Crossing the Fictional Line: Moral Graveness, the Gamer’s Dilemma, and the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far’ (Montefiore & Formosa, 2023).

Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn’t matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following (...) asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism resistant to the standard argument against speciesism. (shrink)

Disagreements that resist rational resolution, often termed “deep disagreements”, have been the focus of much work in epistemology and informal logic. In this paper, I argue that they also deserve the attention of philosophers of mathematics. I link the question of whether there can be deep disagreements in mathematics to a more familiar debate over whether there can be revolutions in mathematics. I propose an affirmative answer to both questions, using the controversy over Shinichi Mochizuki’s work on the abc conjecture (...) as a potential example of both phenomena. I conclude by investigating the prospects for the resolution of mathematical deep disagreements in virtue-theoretic approaches to informal logic and mathematical practice. (shrink)

A list of resources for virtue theories of argumentation. Last updated October 31st, 2023.

Until recently, discussion of virtues in the philosophy of mathematics has been fleeting and fragmentary at best. But in the last few years this has begun to change. As virtue theory has grown ever more influential, not just in ethics where virtues may seem most at home, but particularly in epistemology and the philosophy of science, some philosophers have sought to push virtues out into unexpected areas, including mathematics and its philosophy. But there are some mathematicians already there, ready to (...) meet them, who have explicitly invoked virtues in discussing what is necessary for a mathematician to succeed. In both ethics and epistemology, virtue theory tends to emphasize character virtues, the acquired excellences of people. But people are not the only sort of thing whose excellences may be identified as virtues. Theoretical virtues have attracted attention in the philosophy of science as components of an account of theory choice. Within the philosophy of mathematics, and mathematics itself, attention to virtues has emerged from a variety of disparate sources. Theoretical virtues have been put forward both to analyse the practice of proof and to justify axioms; intellectual virtues have found multiple applications in the epistemology of mathematics; and ethical virtues have been offered as a basis for understanding the social utility of mathematical practice. Indeed, some authors have advocated virtue epistemology as the correct epistemology for mathematics (and perhaps even as the basis for progress in the metaphysics of mathematics). This topical collection brings together several of the researchers who have begun to study mathematical practices from a virtue perspective with the intention of consolidating and encouraging this trend. (shrink)

What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis (...) on the ad misericordiam. (shrink)

Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination and (...) argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naive realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature. (shrink)

The literature on metaphysical explanation contains three widely accepted assumptions. First, that the notion of metaphysical explanation with which philosophers are interested is a notion with which the folk are familiar: it is at least continuous with the folk notion. Second, that metaphysical explanations are true propositions of a certain form that are true, (or false), simpliciter. Third, that it is at least the case that mostly, if x metaphysically explains y, then y does not metaphysically explain x. On the (...) basis of empirical investigations that we pursued, we argue that at least two of these assumptions are false . (shrink)

The traditional view of evidence in mathematics is that evidence is just proof and proof is just derivation. There are good reasons for thinking that this view should be rejected: it misrepresents both historical and current mathematical practice. Nonetheless, evidence, proof, and derivation are closely intertwined. This paper seeks to tease these concepts apart. It emphasizes the role of argumentation as a context shared by evidence, proofs, and derivations. The utility of argumentation theory, in general, and argumentation schemes, in particular, (...) as a methodology for the study of mathematical practice is thereby demonstrated. Argumentation schemes represent an almost untapped resource for mathematics education. Notably, they provide a consistent treatment of rigorous and non-rigorous argumentation, thereby working to exhibit the continuity of reasoning in mathematics with reasoning in other areas. Moreover, since argumentation schemes are a comparatively mature methodology, there is a substantial body of existing work to draw upon, including some increasingly sophisticated software tools. Such tools have significant potential for the analysis and evaluation of mathematical argumentation. The first four sections of the paper address the relationships of evidence to proof, proof to derivation, argument to proof, and argument to evidence, respectively. The final section directly addresses some of the educational implications of an argumentation scheme account of mathematical reasoning. (shrink)

Deep disagreements are characteristically resistant to rational resolution. This paper explores the contribution a virtue theoretic approach to argumentation can make towards settling the practical matter of what to do when confronted with apparent deep disagreement, with particular attention to the virtue of courage.