Kolloquiumsbeiträge des XV. Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie 1990 in Hamburg. Mit Beiträgen von Herbert Schnädelbach, Hilary Putnam, Karl-Otto Apel, Walter Ch. Zimmerli, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Elke Hahn und Klaus Vieweg, Roland Simon-Schaefer, Ruedi Imbach, Georg Wieland, Jan Peter Beckmann, Pierre Aubenque, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Gernot Böhme, Dietrich Böhler, Jürgen Habermas, Friedrich Kambartel, Oswald Schwemmer, Dieter Birnbacher, Karl-Friedrich Wessel, Friedrich Rapp, Otfried Höffe, Henning Ottmann und Terry Pinkard.

Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational, it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can (...) say that habitual responses are, after all, done for reasons. We show how the idea that habitual behaviour cannot be understood as ‘acting for reasons’ stems from a widely but often implicitly held theoretical framework: the causal theory of action. We then propose an alternative, Anscombean understanding of intentional action, which can account for habitual responses being done for reasons. (shrink)

According to Oude Maatman (2020), our recent suggestion (Borsboom et al., 2019) that symptom networks are irreducible because they rely on folk psychological descriptions, threatens to undermine the main achievements of the network approach. In this article, we take up Oude Maatman’s challenge and develop an argument showing in what sense folk psychological concepts describe features of reality, and what it means to say that folk psychology is a causal language.

Autonomous e-coaching systems offer their users suggestions for action, thereby affecting the user's decision-making process. More specifically, the suggestions that these systems make influence the options for action that people actually consider. Surprisingly though, options and the corresponding process of option generation --- a decision-making stage preceding intention formation and action selection --- has received very little attention in the various disciplines studying decision making. We argue that this neglect is unjustified and that it is important, particularly for designers of (...) autonomous e-coaching systems, to understand how human option generation works. The aims of this paper are threefold. The first aim is to generate awareness with designers of autonomous e-coaching systems that these systems do in fact influence their users' options. The second is to show that understanding the interplay between a person's options and the e-coaching system's suggestions is important for improving the effectiveness of the system. The third is that the very same interplay is also crucial for designing e-coaching systems that respect people's autonomy. (shrink)

I begin by defending Heinrich Gustav Hotho’s foundational edition of the Lectures on Aesthetics (LA), contra Gethmann-Siebert. In doing so, I also defend Hegel against the common conceit that his comprehension of music was somehow deficient. Reference to Kant’s transcendental aesthetics then allows us to grasp how, in Hegel, meaningful tones arise from the vibratory oscillation between selfhood’s presiding unity and its temporal ideality or self-positing. Further elements of musical architecture, e.g., rhythm, harmony and melody can likewise be traced (...) back to temporal oscillation. Indeterminate meaning arises through beautiful music’s absolute Ur-Ton, which resonates into the soul of the listener. The temporal vanishing of musical tones is a pre-linguistic expression of meaningfulness itself, and its ambiguous oscillation between the human and the divine. -/- . (shrink)

Published in Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Alessio Cavallaro (eds), _Prefiguring Cyberculture: an intellectual history_ (MIT Press and Power Publications, December 2002). Please do send comments: email me. Back to my main publications page . Back to my home page.

No abstract available. First paragraph: In this issue’s target article, Stier and Schoene-Siefert purport to ‘depotentialize’ the argument from potentiality based on their claim that any human cell may be “converted” into a morally significant entity, and consequently, the argument from potentiality finally succumbs to a reductio ad absurdum. I aim to convey two reasons for skepticism about the innocuousness of the notion of cell convertibility, and hence, the cogency of their argument.

This article presents in the first part the concept of Schelerian phenomenology of religion and claims that pre‐phenomenon of Holiness could not be take in the bracket of existence as usual because the religious act raised by Holiness itself is an heteronomic act of God‐Holiness realized in the man and giving evidence of the existence of its Reasoner. In the second part of this article two types of unity are presented: unity due to joint feeling with others (unmittelbares Mitfühlen — (...) “Two parents stand beside the dead body of a beloved child”) and unity due to co‐operation of personal acts (Mitvollzug — “I live, yet not I, but Christ in me”). This two types of unities present the Other in a primordial way, which launched several criticism against Max Scheler’s mysticism. Phenomenology of act and mysticism seems to merge together in one point, calling Maieutic Birth, a their method becomes enactment of meaning (Vollzugstheorie der Bedeutung — Karl Friedrich Gethmann). (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por objetivo examinar as relações entre conhecimento e verdade (no sentido de descobrimento e abertura), no contexto da Ontologia Fundamental, de Martin Heidegger. Num primeiro momento, busca-se caracterizar o conhecimento como um modo derivado do ser-no-mundo enquanto ocupação, patenteando a estrutura intencional que lhe é própria, bem como explicitando a interpretação fenomenológicoexistencial do “resultado” do comportamento cognoscitivo (conceitos de substância/eidos), que é posta em questão quanto à sua correção, em se considerando os conceitos da Física Moderna. A (...) abordagem do fenômeno do conhecimento, aqui empreendida, culmina com a apresentação das relações “implícitas” entre o modo de ser do conhecimento e o “problema da verdade”, presentes na análise do fenômeno da enunciação predicativa (parágrafo 33, de Ser e Tempo), com base na qual se intenta indicar o lugar da Lógica na Ontologia Fundamental. Em seguida, no contexto da tematização do significado existencial de verdade, foca-se o conceito de Evidenciação (Ausweisung), no qual se entrelaçam plenamente as concepções heideggerianas de conhecimento e de verdade, porquanto se trata da descrição da verdade do conhecimento como um modo de descobrimento enunciativo dos entes tais como são em si mesmos. Busca-se, em primeiro lugar, mostrar a apropriação de Husserl e de Aristóteles, bem como a manutenção da idéia de verdade como adequação, embutidas naquele conceito. Propõe-se a idéia de que a não-verdade (falsidade) dos enunciados predicativos (não explicitamente tematizada por Heidegger, em Ser e Tempo) pode ser pensada a partir do conceito husserliano de “síntese de diferenciação”. Procura-se, ainda, esclarecer o que significa o “em si mesmo” dos entes que se dão na evidenciação e se ocultam na diferenciação, e salientar o aspecto problemático da idéia de uma dadidade dos entes em “si mesmos”, no âmbito da investigação científica. Por fim, apresenta-se a discussão acerca da concepção heideggeriana de verdade, iniciada por Tugendhat, em 1964, e constantemente retomada por vários filósofos, inclusive por Gethmann, cuja interpretação é aqui avaliada. (shrink)

This article aims to critically examine three approaches to reflexivity in philosophical texts, specifically the case when the textuality becomes its own topic. The first approach is when there is no reflexivity at all. It is just describing how – according to the author – things are. As an example of this approach I take German media philosophy. This tradition is specific because reflexivity is supposed to be its very topic. However, the media philosophers succeeded in touching the indefinability of (...) mediality itself. Another method is to question one’s own and possibly also the reader’s position. I have chosen Annemarie Mol’s empirical philosophy as the example here. The problem is that despite following the “ontological turn”, the author remains (probably inevitably) also to a large extent trapped in the fact that he/she describes the world, that is, in subject/object dichotomy and therefore, in epistemology. The third way to write aims to make readers feel what the author tells. My example here is the varied work of Walter Benjamin whom I for the purpose of this article consider more as a prophet rather than the precise thinker who he (also) by all means was. While using the second approach myself, I discuss advantages and challenges of the three and find their points of touch. (shrink)