In the following paper we provide a personal definition of the existential philosophy and the existential subject. Before that we explore other historical definitions of existentialism. We were mainly interested in the relation between existentialism and nihilism, the focus of existential philosophy on the individual and the situation of the studied philosophical trend on the 1950's zeitgeist. The definition of existentialism as a form of trans-rationalism and its capacity to become a practical alternative to contemporary academic philosophy were also emphasized.

The similitude between anxiety and death is the starting point of Paul Tillich's analysis from The Courage To Be, his famous theological and philosophical reply to Heidegger's Being And Time. Not only Tillich and Heidegger are concerned with the connection between anxiety and death but also other proponents of both existentialism and nihilism like Nietzsche, Cioran and Shestov. Tillich observes that "anxiety puts frightening masks" over things and perhaps this definition is its finest contribution to the spectacular phenomenology of anxiety. (...) Moreover, Tillich has some illuminating insights about the anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, which are important for the history of the existential philosophy. It is interesting how the protestant theologian tries to answer to Heidegger: while the German philosopher asserted that we must avoid fear and we have to embrace anxiety as a route to personal authenticity, Tillich notes that we should transform anxiety into fear, because courage is more likely to "abolish" fear. (shrink)

In the following paper I will argue that there are interesting connections between the founder of analytical psychology, Carl Gustav Jung, and the school of existentialism. Analytical psychology and existentialism share almost the same Zeitgeist (becoming influential between the 1930’s and 1960’s) and are both interested in the concept of individuality. I would like to follow the liaison between Jung and existentialism regarding authenticity and death. First of all, the concept of authenticity deserves extensive treatment. Heidegger’s das Man and Sartre’s (...) mauvaise foi have an interesting companion in Jung’s notion of the persona, the psychological concept of “the mask”. Second of all, existentialist authenticity can be compared to the Jungian integration of the shadow. Moreover, the concept of death (Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode) can be compared with Jung’s understanding of death from The Red Book. (shrink)

The Jungian conflict between the persona ("the mask of the soul") and the shadow (a sort of "counter-persona") is, from a philosophical perspective, akin to the dialectic between appearance and essence or, in a more existential fashion, similar to the difference between falseness and authenticity. Starting from a suggestion made by V. Dem. Zamfirescu, one can compare Jung's persona with Sartre's bad faith and Heidegger's das Man. If the persona were a mask mediating between the Ego and the external world, (...) the shadow would be an interface between the Self and the Ego. Remembering that Nietzsche (not only Freud and Schopenhauer) deeply influenced Jung in the constitution of the shadow, one can evaluate it in comparison with one of the key terms of Nietzschean nihilism, the last human being. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Mary Shelley and E. M. Cioran have never been previously analyzed in the same context (they belong not only to different ages but also to divergent genres), we will find that they share at least two similar themes. The motif of solitude, common among Romantic poets (Coleridge, Byron, Poe), finds a deep expression in Shelley’s Frankenstein and in Cioran’s early oeuvre. A more thorough investigation of the British novelist and the Romanian-French self-described “anti-philosopher” discloses that hatred (...) (a theme that is not frequently researched from a philosophical point of view) might be another of their obsessions. The concept of the nihilistic not-man becomes useful when we will follow the tripartite shape of hatred (of others, of myself and of God) not only in literature or philosophy but also in pop culture. (shrink)

In his Philosophy of Redemption (1876) Philipp Mainländer transforms the Schopenhauerian will-to-life into his own concept of will-to-death, preceding Freud’s investigations into the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Mainländer’s post-Schopenhauerian conception that non-being is preferable to being anticipates Cioran’s discussion of suicide from A Short History of Decay (1949) and his vision of the “catastrophe” of birth from The Trouble with Being Born (1973). If, from a Nietzschean perspective, Mainländer’s and Cioran’s obsession with death was a symptom (...) of passive nihilism, their thanatophilia may resonate with our anxious crepuscular mentality, prefiguring contemporary Antinatalism. (shrink)

A new philosophical and psychological concept is needed for the alienated and radically different human being according to the nihilist Romanian-French philosopher E.M. Cioran. This concept of the not-man describes a post-anthropological subject, which is “inhumanˮ from a psychological point of view, emphasizing estrangement and otherness in the definition of humanity. I have compared Cioran's provocative and unusual term with Nietzsche's analysis of the overman – the difference between the two conepts proceeding from two conflicting nihilist perspectives – and I (...) also have identified the not-man in the novel of the Japanese writer Osamu Dazai, No Longer Human. (shrink)

The versions of Nietzschean and Cioranian Antihumanism start from different presuppositions than Foucault’s Antihumanism, adding misanthropy to their nihilistic project. The Cioranian term of the not-man, a darker counterpart to Nietzsche’s Übermensch, can be “tested” through forays into the Romantic and Post-romantic literature, considering for instance Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), Maupassant’s “Horla” (1887), Lorrain’s “The Possessed” (1895) or the poems of Lautréamont. In this paper we compare Cioran’s Antihumanism with the nihilism of Thomas Bernhard’s first novel, Frost (1963).

The following paper is concerned with the description of “agony” at Kierkegaard and Cioran. Taking into consideration that both authors have common traits as marginal philosophers and advocates of a mixture of existentialism and nihilism, I have compared Kierkegaard’s notion of “sickness unto death” (a powerful term, that combines the prestige of several other keywords such as “torture”, “death”, “anxiety” and so on) with Cioran’s description of “agony” from his first Romanian work, On The Heights of Despair. Both Kierkegaard and (...) Cioran, with their emphasis on existential death seem to make a powerful case against Schopenhauer’s equation that pain and death are opposed, therefore imagining damnation to an immanent hell for the modern subject. -/- . (shrink)

In the following paper we explore the utopian theme of revolution in two filmic works of art: the movie Fight Club (1999), directed by David Fincher, and the very recent TV series Mr. Robot (2015), created by Sam Esmail. We will argue that Fight Club is an existential meditation on simulation, dehumanization and the capitalistic tyranny of the objects combined with a nihilistic pursuit of authenticity through violence. Closely following Fight Club’s rumination on madness as “revolution of the self,” Mr. (...) Robot allows us to take a peek into the mystery of revolutionary freedom: will it change everything or will we come to regret our former tyrants? (shrink)

Maupassant’s short horror story Horla (1887) contains a treatment of anxiety that can be analyzed in the context of Existentialist philosophy: Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Levinas or Cioran all observed the anticipatory trait of this affect. From a psychological point of view, anxiety leads to neurosis and/or psychosis, to the splitting of the principle of identity. This inner duality is famously expressed in the short story’s scene of the “empty mirror”, where the main character fails to see his own reflection. The descent (...) into madness of Horla’s diarist makes us think that he experiences the possession of the monster in terms of radical alterity, something that Cioran has called the not-man. I argue that through the lenses of this category of (psychological and theological) inhumanity we can understand Horla as a Nietzschean evolutionary tale that cautions against the end of mankind as we know it. (shrink)