In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle presented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not provide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought (...) out from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not provide good evidence as well. By the analysis of these assumptions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis seeking the salvage of phainomena or endoxa. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to delimitate what the dialectical syllogism looks like in Aristotle’s Topics. Aristotle never gave an example of a dialectical syllogism, but we have some clues spread over books I and VIII of the Topics which make it possible to understand at least what within a dialectical debate is a dialectical syllogism. The interpretation advanced here distinguishes the logical order of the dialectical argumentation from the order of the debate. This distinction enables us (...) to have a better understand of what is and how the dialectical syllogism is identified in the debate. In addition, we can solve some interpretative difficulties other interpretations could not solve, and have a more solid grasp of how endoxa are used in a dialectical debate. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, eu procuro mostrar que a leitura tradicional que atribui um procedimento dialético à abordagem aristotélica da acrasia, em Ética Nicomaquéia VII 1-3 provoca um sério problema interpretativo ao tentar compatibilizar a posição socrática acerca da acrasia e os phanomena. Primeiramente, tento mostrar, baseando-me numa análise de Tópicos I 1-2, que o procedimento metodológico, em EN VII 1 1145b2-7, não se caracteriza como dialético. Em segundo lugar, proponho uma leitura em que Aristóteles, passo a passo refuta a tese socrática (...) que nega a existência da acrasia, uma vez que esse tese não é contada entre os phainomena que se quer preservar. (shrink)

Meu objetivo nesse texto é oferecer uma interpretação do modo como a dialética aristotélica pode ser útil para a filosofia em geral, e o conhecimento dos princípios em particular, sem incorrer em problemas epistemológicos geralmente presentes ao se tentar explicar como, a partir de proposições das quais não temos comprovação do valor de verdade que possuem, as endoxa, se pode conhecer proposições primeiras e verdadeiras. Meu argumento central é que não é a dialética que, afinal, é útil para o conhecimento (...) filosófico, mas o próprio tratado, os Tópicos, na medida em que esse tratado oferece um conjunto amplo de ferramentas argumentativas que permitem ao seu estudante um domínio de técnicas lógico-linguísticas que podem ser aplicadas em qualquer âmbito discursivo, favorecendo o escrutínio mais profundo de proposições a serem examinadas. -/- English: My aim is to develop an interpretation about how Aristotelian dialectic can be useful to philosophy and, in more specific terms, to knowledge of the first principles, avoiding epistemological problems regarding the away one can explain the knowledge of propositions which are primaries and trues, by departing from proposition whose truth-evaluation is not assured, the endoxa. My main argument is that what is in fact useful to get to know the first principles is not dialectic itself, but the treatise at stake, the Topics. Accordingly, this treatise offers an wide set of logical and linguistic tools that can be applied to any discursive universe, favouring a deep scrutiny of proposition to be examined. (shrink)

Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive (...) character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is twofold: I will try to clarify what the conditions developed in EN I a discipline or an argument must meet to be assumed as precise are, and, then, try to present evidence that the exam of akrasia in EN VII 3 meets these conditions. In the first part of this paper, I will select passages in which such conditions are displayed, and also distinguish between practical precision and theoretical precision. In the second part, where (...) the analysis of the senses of having but not using knowledge in EN VII 3 is carried on, I will claim that Aristotle’s objective is reaching the adequate statement of the explanandum that will be the subject of causal enquiry of akrasia. My concluding remarks will claim that the conditions displayed in this paper’s first part are met by Aristotelian procedure in EN VII 3. (shrink)

I claim that Aristotle does not make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism in EN VII 1-3. In these chapters, Aristotle intends exactly the opposite, which is to refute the Socratic thesis that attributes to ignorance the cause of akrasia. I understand that Aristotle’s procedure has two parts whose boundaries are demarcated by the introduction of phusikōs argument. In the first part Aristotle shows some ways of having knowledge that do not produces action in order to contradict the Socratic thesis. In (...) the second part is shown how akratic failure takes place and how it is explained by Aristotelian conception of practical knowledge. Thus, by saying in the conclusion to this second part that Socrates somehow was right, Aristotle does not mean to make any concession to Socratic Intellectualism. Rather, he means that the sentence that conveys the Socratic position by itself could be interpreted as correct, but, despite this, it is an important piece of a complete incorrect theory. (shrink)