This article discusses the extension of ViewGen, an algorithm derived for belief ascription, to the areas of intensional object identification and metaphor. ViewGen represents the beliefs of agents as explicit, partitioned proposition sets known as environments. Environments are convenient, even essential, for addressing important pragmatic issues of reasoning. The article concentrates on showing that the transformation of information in metaphors, intensional object identification, and ordinary, nonmetaphorical belief ascription can all be seen as different manifestations of a single environment-amalgamation process. The (...) article also briefly discusses the extension of ViewGen to speech-act processing and the addition of a heuristic-based relevance-determination procedure, and justifies the partitioning approach to belief ascription. (shrink)

This paper responds to recent developments in the field of sensory augmentation by analysing several technological devices that augment the sensory apparatus using the tactile sense. First, I will define the term sensory augmentation, as the use of technological modification to enhance the sensory apparatus, and elaborate on the preconditions for successful tactile sensory augmentation. These are the adaptability of the brain to unfamiliar sensory input and the specific qualities of the skin lending themselves to be used for the perception (...) of additional sensory information. Two devices, Moon Ribas’ Seismic Sense and David Eagleman’s vest, will then be discussed as potential facilitators of aesthetic experiences in virtue of the tactile sensory augmentation that these devices allow. I will connect the experiences afforded by these devices to the Kantian categories of the mathematical and the dynamical sublime, and to existing accounts of tactile sublimity. Essentially, the objects these devices make sensible, earthquakes for the Seismic Sense and digital information for the vest, produce pleasurable feelings of potential danger, awe, and respect. The subsequent acclimation to this new way of sensing and the aim to comprehend its sensed object are then discussed as possible objections to the interpretation of these experiences as sublime, and as aesthetic in general. To exemplify these issues and concretise my thesis of tactile sensory augmentation as a trigger of the sublime, I will outline an experiment to use the vest as an aid for faster decision making on the stock market. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I aim to develop and defend a novel, pragmatist approach to foundational questions about meaning, especially the meaning of deontic moral vocabulary. Drawing from expressivists and inferentialists, I argue that meaning is best explained by the various kinds of norms that govern the use of a vocabulary. Along with inferential norms, I argue we must extend our account to discursive norms that govern normative statuses required to felicitously utter certain speech-acts—norms of authority—and the transitions in normative statuses (...) affected by speech-acts—pragmatic norms. These structural discursive norms differentiate discursive practices and account for distinctive features such as objectivity and motivational import that some have and others lack. The structure exhibited by a practice is then explained in terms of its utility, making it possible to see how different discursive practices are answerable to the different needs and purposes of the discursive beings who use them. I call the resulting explanatory framework a pragmatic analysis of linguistic meaning (PALM). -/- Turning my attention to moral “ought,” I argue that the structural discursive norms of moral discourse differentiate it from other objective discourses, like empirical discourse, on the one hand, and from other normative discourses, like prudential discourse, on the other. Drawing on work in evolutionary psychology and anthropology, I complete the PALM with an account of moral discourse a meta-normative practice with a metacoordinative function. Its utility for the discursive beings who use it lies in its enabling them to remedy certain tensions and instabilities that arise in their other coordinative, normative practices in a way that minimizes the risk of domination by alpha-type freeriders, the fracturing of social groups, and individual defection from cooperative endeavors. -/- In the final two chapters, I leverage the account to defend a pragmatist-friendly notion of objectivity in terms of a structure of distributed epistemic authority according to which no claim within a practice is ultimately authoritative or immune from challenge and to reconcile this sense of objectivity with a persistent pressure toward a kind of relativism that restricts the standing to make moral claims to members of the relevant communities. (shrink)

Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than adults? In two pre-registered studies (N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both studies, children had a weaker tendency to prioritize humans over animals than adults. They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the (...) life of a dog as much as the life of a human. While they valued pigs less, the majority still prioritized ten pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one human over even one hundred dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in development and is likely socially acquired. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed “the Myth of the Given.” Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, (...) I show that while this argument is sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne’s argument shows only that our empirical beliefs are determined through experience. It does not license the stronger claim that, in order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must be able to justify beliefs. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problematic relationship between thought and nature in Hegel. This entails looking at the philosophy of nature and discovering to what extent it claims to incorporate natural otherness or contingency and how it does so. I briefly summarize other approaches to this question (Maker, Winfield, Braun, Wandschneider, Hoffheimer...) while putting forward my own solution. This is expressed in an argument articulated around the three Hegelian images (and their texts) in the paper’s title. We discover how the (...) relation between philosophy and nature is a dynamic one, mediated by the actual content of the positive natural sciences. In other words, thought and nature are mediated by the human activity of scientific knowing, within the systematic project of knowing all of nature. This raises the possibility of conceiving Hegel’s system as open to the future. (shrink)

‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to (...) make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents. (shrink)

In the first section, I characterize skeptical theism more fully. This is necessary in order to address some important misconceptions and mischaracterizations that appear in the essays by Maitzen, Wilks, and O’Connor. In the second section, I describe the most important objections they raise and group them into four “families” so as to facilitate an orderly series of responses. In the four sections that follow, I respond to the objections.

Rooted in the heart of Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory, mediation has recently received considerable attention in the field of TEFL. The existing literature suggests that mediation can play an essential role in language learners’ performance development. In addition, learners need to know about their thinking process which is interpreted as metacognition. This study aimed to investigate the effect of teacher- and peer-assisted evaluative mediation on learners’ metacognitive awareness development. To this end, 40 homogenized intermediate EFL learners were selected using a test (...) of English language proficiency. The participants were then randomly divided into teacher-assisted (n=20) and peer-assisted (n=20) groups. Before the instructional phase, a metacognitive awareness questionnaire was given to the participants. At the instructional phase, the learners in the teacher-assisted group received teacher-assisted mediation. The learners in the peer-assisted group, however, were exposed to mediation provided by their peers. After the instructional phase, the metacognitive awareness questionnaire was given to the participants as the posttest of the study. SPSS was used to analyze the data. The descriptive statistics, the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, and the Paired Sample T-test for inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The findings showed that peer-assisted evaluative mediation had positive effects on developing students’ level of metacognitive awareness, whereas teacher-assisted evaluative mediation did not reveal such effects. It could be concluded that peer-assisted evaluative mediation is an effective tool for improving students’ metacognitive awareness. (shrink)

This study assessed the administration of punishment, students’ test anxiety, and performance in mathematics in secondary schools of Cross River State. Three null hypotheses were formulated following a correlational research design. Proportionate stratified random sampling technique was employed in selecting a sample of 2,554 respondents representing 5% of the population of 51,097 junior secondary school students distributed across 271 public secondary schools in Cross River State. Administration of Punishment Questionnaire (APQ) designed by the researchers, Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI) developed by (...) Dawood et al., (2016), and Mathematics Achievement Test (MAT) designed by Owan (2012), were used as instruments for data collection. The null hypotheses were tested using one-way MANOVA), Pearson Product Moment Correlation, and Multiple regression analyses with the aid of SPSS v23. Findings revealed amongst others that administration of punishment has a significant influence on students’ test anxiety and performance in mathematics F (6, 5098) = 24.149, p<.05; Wilk’s Λ = 0.945, partial η2 = .028 on a joint basis; administration of punishment has a significant influence respectively on students’ test anxiety F (3, 2550) = 22.697, p<.0005, partial η2 =.026 and performance in mathematics F (3, 2550) = 23.090, P<.0005, partial η2 =.026; there is an inverse significant relationship (r= -339, p<0.05) between students’ tests anxiety and performance in mathematics. It was recommended that the use of corporal punishment should be totally abolished on strict grounds that it hurts the psychological disposition of learners resulting in a dip in their performance consequently. (shrink)

In 2016, this Journal published an article by Rob Lawlor1 on what we might call the acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements. This is the view that there can be cases in which a patient is sufficiently competent to accept a treatment ( viz., to give consent to it), but not sufficiently competent to refuse it ( viz., to withhold consent to it). Though the main purpose of Lawlor’s paper was to distinguish this asymmetry from various other asymmetries with which it (...) has sometimes been confused,1 Lawlor also presented a brief case in favour of it. Developing an earlier argument of Ian Wilks’,2 3 Lawlor argued that, when the risks associated with refusing a treatment are graver than those associated with accepting it, a higher level of competence may be required to refuse a treatment than to accept it. This claim could have important implications for the law, since determinations of competence often play a central role in determining the lawfulness of refusing or imposing a treatment (eg, in England and Wales under the Mental Capacity Act 2005). Indeed, the acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements, or something close to it, has played an important role in court judgments.2 However, Lawlor himself suggests that his conclusion will have practical implications only in a narrow range of cases.3 In this issue, Pickering, Giles Newton-Howes and Simon Walker (henceforth ‘the authors’) respond to Lawlor’s piece.4 They deny that competence requirements should depend on the level of risk associated with a decision, and thus that there is any basis for the acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements. Part of the authors’ argument involves contesting the way in which Lawlor uses cases to support his view. In one case cited by Lawlor—and drawn from Wilks—we are invited to consider a whether …. (shrink)

Every higher education institution (HEI) needs to monitor the employability status of its graduates as this reflects the quality education that HEIs provide to their students. In this study, a retrospective approach was used to analyze the employment status of graduates of a state university in the Philippines from 2015 to 2019. A data mining procedure was adopted to obtain necessary data and analysis. It was hypothesized in the study that the employment rates are the same across programs per year. (...) Also, the employment rates from 2015 to 2019 are the same as the targeted employment rate in the strategic plan of the university. Statistical treatments such as mean, median, and standard deviation, Shapiro-Wilk test, and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were used to test the hypothesis. Results show that the employment rate of graduates of 2015-2019 is in the high-level category and significantly higher than the targeted employment rate in the university strategic plan. Similarly, findings show significant differences in the employability rates of graduates considering the programs they enrolled in. On the contrary, no significant difference in the employment rate of graduates per year graduated. The study concluded that the university is consistent in producing employable graduates. (shrink)

Few philosophers would deny that unconscious motives enter into causal explanations of human behavior. But many would be reluctant to say that deeply unconscious motives have anything to do with the intentionality with which we act. I argue to the contrary that deeply unconscious motives can indeed contribute to agent-intentionality on the following condition: If she were self-aware and honest with respect to her unconscious motive, the agent would believe that it constituted her reason for the action of which it (...) was a cause. I conclude that when an agent’s conscious reasons are vague, confused, or self-deceiving, her unconscious reason-grounding motive may fill what would otherwise be a gap in her intentionality. (shrink)