Scientific Representation

In this paper I argue against a deflationist view that as representational vehicles symbols and models do their jobs in essentially the same way. I argue that symbols are conventional vehicles whose chief function is denotation while models are epistemic vehicles whose chief function is showing what their targets are like in the relevant aspects. It is further pointed out that models usually do not rely on similarity or some such relations to relate to their targets. For that referential relation (...) they reply instead on symbols (names and labels) given to them and their parts. And a Goodmanian view on pictures of fictional characters reveals the distinction between symbolic and model representations. (shrink)

Contemporary action theory is generally concerned with giving theories of action ontology. In this paper, we make the novel proposal that the standard view in action theory—the Causal Theory of Action—should be recast as a “model”, akin to the models constructed and investigated by scientists. Such models often consist in fictional, hypothetical, or idealized structures, which are used to represent a target system indirectly via some resemblance relation. We argue that recasting the Causal Theory as a model can not only (...) accomplish the goals of causal theorists, but also give the theory greater flexibility in responding to common objections. (shrink)

Despite its centrality in the philosophy of cognitive science, there has been little prior philosophical work engaging with the notion of representation in contemporary NLP practice. This paper attempts to fill that lacuna: drawing on ideas from cognitive science, I introduce a framework for evaluating the representational claims made about components of neural NLP models, proposing three criteria with which to evaluate whether a component of a model represents a property and operationalising these criteria using probing classifiers, a popular analysis (...) technique in NLP (and deep learning more broadly). The project of operationalising a philosophically-informed notion of representation should be of interest to both philosophers of science and NLP practitioners. It affords philosophers a novel testing-ground for claims about the nature of representation, and helps NLPers organise the large literature on probing experiments, suggesting novel avenues for empirical research. (shrink)

I argue that normative formal epistemology (NFE) is best understood as modelling, in the sense that this is the reconstruction of its methodology on which NFE is doing best. I focus on Bayesianism and show that it has the characteristics of modelling. But modelling is a scientific enterprise, while NFE is normative. I thus develop an account of normative models on which they are idealised representations put to normative purposes. Normative assumptions, such as the transitivity of comparative credence, are characterised (...) as modelling idealisations motivated normatively. I then survey the landscape of methodological options: what might formal epistemologists be up to? I argue the choice is essentially binary: modelling or theorising. If NFE is theorising it is doing very poorly: generating false claims with no clear methodology for separating out what is to be taken seriously. Modelling, by contrast, is a successful methodology precisely suited to the management of useful falsehoods. Regarding NFE as modelling is not costless, however. First, our normative inferences are less direct and are muddied by the presence of descriptive idealisations. Second, our models are purpose-specific and limited in their scope. I close with suggestions for how to adapt our practice. (shrink)

Maps and mapping raise questions about models and modeling and in science. This chapter archives map discourse in the founding generation of philosophers of science (e.g., Rudolf Carnap, Nelson Goodman, Thomas Kuhn, and Stephen Toulmin) and in the subsequent generation (e.g., Philip Kitcher, Helen Longino, and Bas van Fraassen). In focusing on these two original framing generations of philosophy of science, I intend to remove us from the heat of contemporary discussions of abstraction, representation, and practice of science and thereby (...) see in a more distant and neutral light the many productive ways in which maps can stand in analytically for scientific theories and models. The chapter concludes by complementing the map analogy – i.e., a scientific theory is a map of the world – with a model analogy, viz., a scientific model is a vehicle for understanding. (shrink)

Geographic Information Science (GIS) is an interdisciplinary science aiming to detect and visually represent patterns in spatial data. GIS is used by businesses to determine where to open new stores and by conservation biologists to identify field study locations with relatively little anthropogenic influence. Products of GIS include topographic and thematic maps of the Earth’s surface, climate maps, and spatially referenced demographic graphs and charts. In addition to its social, political, and economic importance, GIS is of intrinsic philosophical interest due (...) to its methodological richness and because it is an instructive analogue to other sciences. This chapter works towards a philosophy of GIS and cartography, or PGISC. In particular, it examines practices of classifying geographic space, objects, and relations. By focusing on the use of natural kinds in data modeling and map generalization practices, I show how the making and using of kinds is contextual, fallible, plural, and purposive. (shrink)

Why study notations, diagrams, or more broadly the variety of nonverbal “representations” or “signs” that are used in mathematical practice? This chapter maps out recent work on the topic by distinguishing three main philosophical motivations for doing so. First, some work (like that on diagrammatic reasoning) studies signs to recover norms of informal or historical mathematical practices that would get lost if the particular signs that these practices rely on were translated away; work in this vein has the potential to (...) broaden our view of the specific normativity of mathematics beyond logical proof. Second, some work focuses on signs to highlight the open-ended and “nonrigorous” aspects of mathematical practice, and the role of these aspects in the historical development of mathematics. The third motivation is based on the following observation: the reason differences in signs matter in mathematics is that humans are finite agents, with cognitive and computational limitations. Accordingly, studying signs can be a way to study how human computational constraints shape the mathematics that we do, and to tackle the topic of mathematical understanding. (shrink)

Scientific research is constrained by limited resources, so it is imperative that it be conducted efficiently. This paper introduces the notion of epistemic expression, a kind of representation that expedites the solution of research problems. Epistemic expressions are representations that (i) contain information in a way that enables more reliable information to place the most stringent constraints on possible solutions and (ii) make new information readily extractible by biasing the search through that space. I illustrate these conditions using historical and (...) contemporary examples of biomolecular structure determination. Then, I argue that the notion of epistemic expression parts ways with pragmatic accounts of scientific representation and an understanding of models as artifacts, neither of which require models to accurately represent. Explicating epistemic expression thus fills a gap in our understanding of scientific practice, extending Morrison and Morgan's (1999) conception of models as investigative instruments. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to approach the way in which Kant considers the “analogies of experience” necessary connections for the scientific representation of the physical world to occur. The method consists of carrying out a conceptual analysis of selected excerpts from theCritique of pure reasonthat may serve to support the interpretation that the analogies of experience are, for Kant, rules that determine the necessary links between perceptions and the ability to understand phenomena. from them. In this way, we (...) seek to explain the divergence between pure knowledge and empirical knowledge, as well as the way in which physics manages to maintain its a priori concepts. -/- O objetivo deste artigo é abordar a maneira como Kant considera as “analogias da experiência” ligações necessárias para ocorrer a representação científica do mundo físico. O método consiste em analisar trechos selecionados da Crítica da razão pura, sobretudo do texto “Analítica dos princípios”, que apresentem as analogias da experiência como regras que determinam as ligações necessárias entre as percepções e a capacidade de compreensão dos fenômenos. Kant argumenta que embora os objetos sejam em si mesmos inacessíveis a nós isto não implica a impossibilidade de pensarmos neles. O resultado é uma perspectiva sobre o conhecimento científico capaz de considerar as analogias da experiência para manter alguns conceitos a priori sobre o mundo físico. (shrink)

The type-level abstraction is a formal way to represent molecular structures in biological practice. Graphical representations of molecular structures of biological objects are also used to identify functional processes of things. This paper will reveal that category theory is a formal mathematical language not only to visualize molecular structures of biological objects as type-level abstraction formally but also to understand how to infer biological functions from the molecular structures of biological objects. Category theory is a toolkit to understand biological knowledge (...) at the type-level formally, not individual token-level, as well as typical heuristic strategies in molecular biology. (shrink)

It is often claimed that one can avoid the kind of underdetermination that is a typical consequence of symmetries in physics by stipulating that symmetry-related models represent the same state of affairs (Leibniz Equivalence). But recent commentators (Dasgupta 2011; Pooley 2021; Pooley and Read 2021; Teitel 2021a) have responded that claims about the representational capacities of models are irrelevant to the issue of underdetermination, which concerns possible worlds themselves. In this paper I distinguish two versions of this objection: (1) that (...) a theory’s formalism does not (fully) determine the space of physical possibilities, and (2) that the relevant notion of possibility is not physical possibility. I offer a refutation of each. (shrink)

This article adopts a bottom-up approach to theory interpretation, following the slogan “meaning is use”, and applies it to quantum mechanics. I argue that it fits very well with the Consistent Histories formulation of quantum mechanics, interpreted in a particular way that is not the interpretation favoured by original proponents of the formulation. I examine the difficulties and advantages of this interpretation.

Biologists often study particular biological systems as models of a phenomenon of interest even if they already know that the phenomenon is produced by diverse mechanisms and hence none of those systems alone can sufficiently represent it. To understand this modeling practice, the present paper provides an account of how multiple model systems can be used to study a phenomenon that is produced by diverse mechanisms. Even if generalizability of results from a single model system is significantly limited, generalizations concerning (...) specific aspects of mechanisms often hold across certain ranges of biological systems, which enables multiple model systems to jointly represent such a phenomenon. Comparing mechanisms that operate in different biological systems as examples of the same phenomenon also facilitates characterization and investigation of individual mechanisms. I also compare my account with two existing accounts of the use of multiple model systems and argue that my account is distinct from and complementary to them. (shrink)

The question “what is an interpretation?” is often intertwined with the perhaps even harder question “what is a scientific theory?”. Given this proximity, we try to clarify the first question to acquire some ground for the latter. The quarrel between the syntactic and semantic conceptions of scientific theories occupied a large part of the scenario of the philosophy of science in the 20th century. For many authors, one of the two currents needed to be victorious. We endorse that such debate, (...) at least in the terms commonly expressed, can be misleading. We argue that the traditional notion of “interpretation” within the syntax/semantic debate is not the same as that of the debate concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics. As much as the term is the same, the term “interpretation” as employed in quantum mechanics has its meaning beyond (pure) logic. Our main focus here lies on the formal aspects of the solutions to the measurement problem. There are many versions of quantum theory, many of them incompatible with each other. In order to encompass a wider variety of approaches to quantum theory, we propose a different one with an emphasis on pure formalism. This perspective has the intent of elucidating the role of each so-called “interpretation” of quantum mechanics, as well as the precise origin of the need to interpret it. (shrink)

One of the problems that are often indicated as a criticism of different forms of representationalism is the difficulty to find definitions that are neither semantic nor realist in a simple sense. The present work tackles this class of critiques from a contextualist point of view, assuming those semantic aspects that are necessary for a concept of representation, but showing that semantic relations of representation should neither be static, nor referential in a classical and strictly realist sense. Two distinctions are (...) crucial for our proposal: On the one hand, we have the distinction between closed and open systems; on the other, a tripartite distinction between structural, informational and semantic representations. On this basis, we understand representations in terms of asymmetric variations between contextual models. (shrink)

This chapter gives an overview of the various themes and issues discussed in the volume. It includes summaries of all chapters and places the contributions, some of which are part of a critical conversation format, in the context of the larger literature and debates.

This essay presents a fully inferentialist-expressivist account of scientific representation. In general, inferentialist approaches to scientific representation argue that the capacity of a model to represent a target system depends on inferences from models to target systems. Inferentialism is attractive because it makes the epistemic function of models central to their representational capacity. Prior inferentialist approaches to scientific representation, however, have depended on some representational element, such as denotation or representational force. Brandom’s Making It Explicit provides a model of how (...) to fully discharge such representational vocabulary, but it cannot be applied directly to scientific representations. Pursuing a strategy parallel to Brandom’s, this essay begins with an account of how surrogative inference is justified. Scientific representation and the denotation of model elements are then explained in terms of surrogative inference by treating scientific representation and denotation as expressive, analogous to Brandom’s account of truth. The result is a thoroughgoing inferentialism: M is a scientific representation of T if and only if M has scientifically justified surrogative consequences that are answers to questions about T. (shrink)

Review: J. E. Wolff. The metaphysics of quantity. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 240 pp, $72.00 HB.

This paper aims to meet an objection that has been raised against structural empiricism known as the “loss of reality objection.” I argue that an inferential approach to scientific representation allows the structural empiricist to account for the representation of phenomena by data models and ensures that such a representation is not arbitrary. By the notions of immersion, derivation, and interpretation, I show how data models are able to represent phenomena in a non-arbitrary manner. I conclude this paper with a (...) programmatic outline of a view that arises from the theses defended throughout the article and that I would like to call “semantic structuralism.”. (shrink)

On entend généralement par « théorie des modèles » autant la métamathématique (ou sémantique formelle) que la sémantique des modèles des sciences non formelles. Cet article a pour objet la théorie des modèles scientifiques que Mario Bunge a développée dans Method, Models and Matter (1973). J’y analyse l’intégration théorique qu’opère Bunge des sciences formelles et des sciences expérimentales ou observationnelles, laquelle prend appui sur sa philosophie des sciences. Je la compare sommairement à la théorie des modèles de Gilles-Gaston Granger dans (...) le but évident d’en dégager les ressemblances et les dissimilitudes, mais aussi leur commun point d’achoppement : l’une comme l’autre usent en effet d’un concept non analysé dont la fonction épistémologique est pourtant capitale et produit les mêmes effets. Au centre de la théorie des modèles de Bunge se trouve le concept de simulation que je comparerai à celui qui est en usage dans les sciences de l’ordinateur et qui est de nos jours largement appliqué à diverses sciences, tant sociales que naturelles. Je conclurai sur les conséquences méthodologiques et métaphysiques de la théorie bungéenne des modèles. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to establish a connection between modelling practices and interpretive approaches in quantum mechanics, taking as a starting point the literature on scientific representation. Different types of modalities play different roles in scientific representation. I postulate that the way theoretical structures are interpreted in this respect affects the way models are constructed. In quantum mechanics, this would be the case in particular of initial conditions and observables. I examine two formulations of quantum mechanics, the standard (...) wave-function formulation and the consistent histories formulation, and show that they correspond to opposite stances, which confirms my approach. Finally, I examine possible strategies for deciding between these stances. (shrink)

Sometimes, scientific models are either intended to or plausibly interpreted as representing nonactual but possible targets. Call this “hypothetical modeling”. This paper raises two epistemological challenges concerning hypothetical modeling. To begin with, I observe that given common philosophical assumptions about the scope of objective possibility, hypothetical models are fallible with respect to what is objectively possible. There is thus a need to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate hypothetical modeling. The first epistemological challenge is that no account of the epistemology of (...) hypothetical models seems to cohere with the most characteristic function of scientific modeling in general, i.e., surrogative representation. The second epistemological challenge is a version of “reliability challenges” familiar from other areas. There is a challenge to explain how hypothetical models could be a reliable guide to what is possible, given that they are not and cannot be compared against their nonactual targets and updated accordingly. I close with some brief remarks on possible solutions to these challenges. (shrink)

While the predominant focus of the philosophical literature on scientific modeling has been on single-scale models, most systems in nature exhibit complex multiscale behavior, requiring new modeling methods. This challenge of modeling phenomena across a vast range of spatial and temporal scales has been called the tyranny of scales problem. Drawing on research in the geosciences, I synthesize and analyze a number of strategies for taming this tyranny in the context of conceptual, physical, and mathematical modeling. This includes several strategies (...) that can be deployed in physical modeling, even when strict dynamical scaling fails. In all cases, I argue that having an adequate conceptual model—given both the nature of the system and the particular purpose of the model—is essential. I draw a distinction between depiction and representation, and use this research in the geosciences to advance a number of debates in the philosophy of modeling. (shrink)

We critically engage two traditional views of scientific data and outline a novel philosophical view that we call the pragmatic-representational view of data. On the PR view, data are representations that are the product of a process of inquiry, and they should be evaluated in terms of their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes. Some important implications of the PR view for data assessment, related to misrepresentation, context-sensitivity, and complementary use, are highlighted. The PR view provides insight into the common (...) but little-discussed practices of iteratively reusing and repurposing data, which result in many datasets’ having a phylogeny—an origin and complex evolutionary history—that is relevant to their evaluation and future use. We relate these insights to the open-data and data-rescue movements, and highlight several future avenues of research that build on the PR view of data. (shrink)

Mathematics is often taken to play one of two roles in the empirical sciences: either it represents empirical phenomena or it explains these phenomena by imposing constraints on them. This article identifies a third and distinct role that has not been fully appreciated in the literature on applicability of mathematics and may be pervasive in scientific practice. I call this the “bridging” role of mathematics, according to which mathematics acts as a connecting scheme in our explanatory reasoning about why and (...) how two different descriptions of an empirical phenomenon relate to each other. I discuss two bridging roles appearing in biological and physical explanations. (shrink)

This paper discusses modeling from the artifactual perspective. The artifactual approach conceives models as erotetic devices. They are purpose-built systems of dependencies that are constrained in view of answering a pending scientific question, motivated by theoretical or empirical considerations. In treating models as artifacts, the artifactual approach is able to address the various languages of sciences that are overlooked by the traditional accounts that concentrate on the relationship of representation in an abstract and general manner. In contrast, the artifactual approach (...) focuses on epistemic affordances of different kinds of external representational and other tools employed in model construction. In doing so, the artifactual account gives a unified treatment of different model types as it circumvents the tendency of the fictional and other representational approaches to separate model systems from their “model descriptions”. (shrink)

Reichenbach’s early solution to the scientific problem of how abstract mathematical representations can successfully express real phenomena is rooted in his view of coordination. In this paper, I claim that a Reichenbach-inspired, ‘layered’ view of coordination provides us with an effective tool to systematically analyse some epistemic and conceptual intricacies resulting from a widespread theorising strategy in evolutionary biology, recently discussed by Okasha (2018) as ‘endogenization’. First, I argue that endogenization is a form of extension of natural selection theory that (...) comprises three stages: quasi-axiomatisation, functional extension, and semantic extension. Then, I argue that the functional extension of one core principle of natural selection theory, namely, the principle of heritability, requires the semantic extension of the concept of inheritance. This is because the semantic extension of ‘inheritance’ is necessary to establish a novel form of coordination between the principle of heritability and the extended domain of phenomena that it is supposed to represent. Finally, I suggest that – despite the current lack of consensus on the right semantic extension of ‘inheritance’ – we can fruitfully understand the reconceptualization of ‘inheritance’ provided by niche construction theorists as the result of a novel form of coordination. (shrink)

A Série Investigação Filosófica, uma iniciativa do Núcleo de Ensino e Pesquisa em Filosofia do Departamento de Filosofia da UFPel e do Grupo de Pesquisa Investigação Filosófica do Departamento de Filosofia da UNIFAP, sob o selo editorial do NEPFil online e da Editora da Universidade Federal de Pelotas, com auxílio financeiro da John Templeton Foundation, tem por objetivo precípuo a publicação da tradução para a língua portuguesa de textos selecionados a partir de diversas plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, tal como a Stanford (...) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, por exemplo. O objetivo geral da série é disponibilizar materiais bibliográficos relevantes tanto para a utilização enquanto material didático quanto para a própria investigação filosófica. (shrink)

I critically examine the assumption that the theoretical structure that varies under theoretical symmetries is redundant and should be eliminated from a metaphysical picture of the universe, following a ‘symmetry to reality’ inference. I do so by analysing the status of coordinate change symmetries taking a pragmatic approach. I argue that coordinate systems function as indexical devices, and play an important pragmatic role for representing concrete physical systems. I examine the implications of considering this pragmatic role seriously, taking what I (...) call a perspectivist stance. My conclusion is that under a perspectivist stance, all symmetries (including local gauge symmetries) potentially have a direct empirical status: they point to dynamical aspects that are invariant under changes of operationalisation, and they constitute a guide not to reality, but to nomology and kinship. (shrink)

Callender and Cohen have proposed to apply a “Gricean strategy” to the constitution problem of scientific representation, taking inspiration from Grice’s reduction of linguistic meaning to mental states. They suggest that scientific representation can be reduced to stipulation by epistemic agents. This account has been criticised for not making a distinction between symbolic and epistemic representation and not taking into account the communal aspects of scientific representation. I argue that these criticisms would not apply if Grice’s actual strategy were properly (...) employed. I present Grice’s account of linguistic meaning and transpose his actual strategy and method to epistemic representation. This results in a reduction of epistemic representation to mental states that does not fall prey to the same criticisms. The main novelty of the resulting account is a distinction between contextual representational use and general representational status, which I address using the notion of indexicality. (shrink)

Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that an apparatus’s representing a target system consists in the apparatus allowing “surrogative inferences” about the target. I argue that a serious problem for inferentialism arises from the fact that many scientific theories and models contain internal inconsistencies. Inferentialism, left unamended, implies that inconsistent scientific models have unlimited representational power, since an inconsistency permits any conclusion to be inferred. I consider a number of ways that inferentialists can respond to this challenge before suggesting my own (...) solution. I develop an analogy to exploitable glitches in a game. Even though inconsistent representational apparatuses may in some sense allow for contradictions to be generated within them, doing so violates the intended function of the apparatus’s parts and hence violates representational “gameplay.”. (shrink)

Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, (...) I investigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict. Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform metaphysics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead. (shrink)

This article offers a characterization of what I call multiple-models juxtaposition, a strategy for managing trade-offs among modeling desiderata. MMJ displays models of distinct phenomena to...

We address the need for a model by considering two competing theories regarding the origin of life: (i) the Metabolism First theory, and (ii) the RNA World theory. We discuss two interrelated points, namely: (i) Models are valuable tools for understanding both the processes and intricacies of origin-of-life issues, and (ii) Insights from models also help us to evaluate the core objection to origin-of-life theories, called “the inefficiency objection”, which is commonly raised by proponents of both the Metabolism First theory (...) and the RNA World theory against each other. We use Simpson’s Paradox (SP) as a tool for challenging this objection. We will use models in various senses, ranging from taking them as representations of reality to treating them as theories/accounts that provide heuristics for probing reality. In this paper, we will frequently use models and theories interchangeably. Additionally, we investigate Conway’s Game of Life and contrast it with our SP-based approach to emergence-of-life issues. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences of our view. A scientific model is testable in three senses: (i) a logical sense, (ii) a nomological sense, and (iii) a current technological sense. The SP-based model is testable in the first two senses but it is not feasible to test it using current technology. (shrink)

The second edition of the work of the Brazilian physicist Paulo C. Abrantes (2016), entitled Images of nature, images of science, is a good alternative for students of history and philosophy of science. The reason is Abrantes' thesis in this work: to defend that the development of scientific knowledge is dependent on the influence of different images of "nature" and "science" existing during the history of Western scientific-philosophical thought; and an advocate for the historian of science Studying as reasons that (...) allow the adoption of such images at a given time. Through the analysis of historical cases of scientific thought, Abrantes argues that the consolidation of research programs in different subareas of natural science - such as biology, physics and chemistry - was only possible due to the influence, in particular time, of images of nature and science. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

Perspectival realism combines two apparently contradictory aspects: the epistemic relativity of perspectives and the mind-independence of realism. This paper examines the prospects for a coherent perspectival realism, taking the literature on scientific representation as a starting point. It is argued that representation involves two types of norms, referred to as norms of relevance and norms of accuracy. Norms of relevance fix the domain of application of a theory and the way it categorises the world, and norms of accuracy give the (...) conditions for the theory to be true. Perspectival realism could be made coherent by taking a realist stance towards one type of norm, and a perspectival stance towards the other, by assuming they are relative to a community. This provides two versions of perspectival realism, called relevance perspectivism and accuracy perspectivism. How each option fares with respect to the challenge of incompatible models is examined. Finally, the prospects of full perspectivism are evaluated. (shrink)

Semantic realism can be characterised as the idea that scientific theories are truth-bearers, and that they are true or false in virtue of the world. This notion is often assumed, but rarely discussed in the literature. I examine how it fares in the context of the semantic view of theories and in connection with the literature on scientific representation. Making sense of semantic realism requires specifying the conditions of application of theoretical models, even for models that are not actually used, (...) which leads to several difficulties. My conclusion is that semantic realism is far more demanding than one would expect. Finally, I briefly examine some pragmatist alternatives. (shrink)

This thesis starts with three challenges to the structuralist accounts of applied mathematics. Structuralism views applied mathematics as a matter of building mapping functions between mathematical and target-ended structures. The first challenge concerns how it is possible for a non-mathematical target to be represented mathematically when the mapping functions per se are mathematical objects. The second challenge arises out of inconsistent early calculus, which suggests that mathematical representation does not require rigorous mathematical structures. The third challenge comes from renormalisation group (...) (RG) explanations of universality. It is argued that the structural mapping between the world and a highly abstract minimal model adds little value to our understanding of how RG obtains its explanatory force. I will address the first and second challenges from the similarity perspective. The similarity account captures representations as similarity relations, providing a more flexible and broader conception of representation than structuralism. It is the specification of the respect and degree of similarity that forges mathematics into a context of representation and directs it to represent a specific system in reality. Structuralism is treatable as a tool for explicating similarity rela-tions set-theoretically. The similarity account, combined with other approaches (e.g., Nguyen and Frigg’s extensional abstraction account and van Fraassen’s pragmatic equivalence), can dissolve the first challenge. Additionally, I will make a structuralist response to the second challenge, and suggestions regarding the role of infinitesimals from the similarity perspective. In light of the similarity account, I will propose the “hotchpotch picture” as a method-ological reflection of our study of representation and explanation. Its central insight is to dissect a representation or an explanation into several aspects and use different theories (that are usually thought of competing) to appropriate each of them. Based on the hotchpotch picture, RG explanations can be dissected to the “indexing” and “inferential” conceptions of explanation, which are captured or characterised by structural mappings. Therefore, structuralism accommodates RG explanations, and the third challenge is resolved. (shrink)

El primer objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que explicaciones genuinamente geométricas/matemáticas e intrínsecamente diagramáticas de fenómenos físicos no solo son posibles en la práctica científica, sino que además comportan un potencial epistémico que sus contrapartes simbólico-verbales carecen. Como ejemplo representativo utilizaremos la metodología geométrica de John Wheeler (1963) para calcular cantidades físicas en una reacción nuclear. Como segundo objetivo pretendemos analizar, desde un marco inferencial, la garantía epistémica de este tipo de explicaciones en términos de dependencia sintáctica y semántica (...) del contenido lo inferido en las premisas, lo cual denominaremos criterio de validez inferencial (CVI). (shrink)

Discussion of modeling within philosophy of science has focused in how models, understood as finished products, represent the world. This approach has some issues accounting for the value of modeling in situations where there are controversies as to which should be the object of representation. In this work I show that a historical analysis of modeling complements the aforementioned representational program, since it allows us to examine processes of integration of analogies that play a role in the generation of criteria (...) of relevance, which are important for the configuration of the object of research. This, in turn, shows that there are norms in modeling practices whose historical reconstruction is relevant for their philosophical analysis. (shrink)

In recent decades, philosophers of science have devoted considerable efforts to understand what models represent. One popular position is that models represent fictional situations. Another position states that, though models often involve fictional elements, they represent real objects or scenarios. Though these two positions may seem to be incompatible, I believe it is possible to reconcile them. Using a threefold distinction between different signs proposed by Peirce, I develop an argument based on a proposal recently made by Kralemann and Lattman (...) (in Synthese 190:3397–3420, 2013) that shows that the two aforementioned positions can be reconciled by distinguishing different ways in which a model representation can be used. In particular, on the basis of Peirce’s distinction between icons, indices and symbols, I argue that models can sometimes function as icons, sometimes as indexes and sometimes as symbols, depending on the context in which they are considered and the use that they are developed for because they all have iconic, indexical and symbolic features. In addition, I show that conceiving models as signs enables us to develop an account of scientific representation that meets the main desiderata that Shech (in Synthese 192:3463–3485, 2015) presents. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to comprehensively study various robustness arguments proposed in the literature from Levins to Lloyd as well as the opposition offered to them and pose enquiry into the degree of epistemic virtue that they provide to the model prediction results with respect to climate science and modeling. Another critical issue that this dissertation strives to examine is that of the actual epistemic notion that is operational when scientists and philosophers appeal to robustness. In attempting to (...) explicate this idea, the discussion turns to arguments provided by Schupbach who completely rejects probabilistic independence in favour of explanatory reasoning, Stegenga and Menon who still see some value in probabilistic independence, and Winsberg who takes applies Schupbach’s to climate science, going beyond models to involve multi-modal evidence. After an exhaustive discussion on these arguments, this dissertation attempts to provide a thorough and updated notion of robustness in climate modeling and climate science. (shrink)

Lucrarea tratează unul dintre “misterele” filosofiei analitice şi ale raţionalităţii însăşi, anume aplicabilitatea matematicii în ştiinţe şi în investigarea matematică a realităţii înconjurătoare, a cărei filosofie este dezvoltată în jurul sintagmei – de acum paradigmatice – ‘eficacitatea iraţională a matematicii’, aparţinând fizicianului Eugene Wigner, problemă filosofică etichetată în literatură drept “puzzle-ul lui Wigner”. Odată intraţi în profunzimea acestei probleme, investigaţia nu trebuie limitată la căutarea unor răspunsuri explicative la întrebări precum “Ce este de fapt aplicabilitatea matematicii?”, “Cum explicăm prezenţa în (...) natură a conceptelor matematice simple şi complexe?” sau “Cum explicăm rata de succes uriaşă a aplicaţiilor matematice, care presupun modele aproximativ false ale unei realităţi idealizate?”, ci extinsă în plan metateoretic către căutarea unei justificări teoretice a utilizării metodei matematice în practica ştiinţifică, independent de succesul acestei metode. Aceste întrebări şi probleme sunt abordate în detaliu în lucrarea de faţă. Lucrarea, care va continua cu un al doilea titlu, dedicat modelelor teoretice ale aplicabilităţii şi alternativelor structurale ale acestora, se adresează în special – dar nu exclusiv – matematicienilor, fizicienilor, filosofilor ştiinţei, filosofilor limbajului şi epistemologilor, dar şi studenţilor acestor discipline. (shrink)

Problemele filosofie sensibile pe care le pune aplicabilitatea matematicii în ştiinţe şi viaţa de zi cu zi au conturat, pe un fond interdisciplinar, o nouă “ramură” a filosofiei ştiinţei, anume filosofia aplicabilităţii matematicii. Aplicarea cu succes a matematicii de-a lungul istoriei ştiinţei necesită reprezentare, încadrare, explicaţie, dar şi o justificare de ordin metateoretic a aplicabilităţii. Între rolurile matematicii în practica ştiinţifică, rolul constitutiv teoriilor ştiinţifice este cel a cărui analiză poate contribui esenţial la această justificare. În lucrarea de faţă, am (...) analizat acest rol constitutiv prin prisma relaţiilor sale cu celelalte roluri importante ale matematicii (descriptiv-semantic-reprezentaţional, inferenţial-explicativ-predictiv), încercând să surprind motivaţia primară a acestui rol relativ la ideea de structură matematică şi epistemică, componente esenţiale ale ştiinţei structurale matematizate. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary understanding requires integration of insights from different perspectives, yet it appears questionable whether disciplinary experts are well prepared for this. Indeed, psychological and cognitive scientific studies suggest that expertise can be disadvantageous because experts are often more biased than non-experts, for example, or fixed on certain approaches, and less flexible in novel situations or situations outside their domain of expertise. An explanation is that experts’ conscious and unconscious cognition and behavior depend upon their learning and acquisition of a set (...) of mental representations or knowledge structures. Compared to beginners in a field, experts have assembled a much larger set of representations that are also more complex, facilitating fast and adequate perception in responding to relevant situations. This article argues how metacognition should be employed in order to mitigate such disadvantages of expertise: By metacognitively monitoring and regulating their own cognitive processes and representations, experts can prepare themselves for interdisciplinary understanding. Interdisciplinary collaboration is further facilitated by team metacognition about the team, tasks, process, goals, and representations developed in the team. Drawing attention to the need for metacognition, the article explains how philosophical reflection on the assumptions involved in different disciplinary perspectives must also be considered in a process complementary to metacognition and not completely overlapping with it. (Disciplinary assumptions are here understood as determining and constraining how the complex mental representations of experts are chunked and structured.) The article concludes with a brief reflection on how the process of Reflective Equilibrium should be added to the processes of metacognition and philosophical reflection in order for experts involved in interdisciplinary collaboration to reach a justifiable and coherent form of interdisciplinary integration. An Appendix of “Prompts or Questions for Metacognition” that can elicit metacognitive knowledge, monitoring, or regulation in individuals or teams is included at the end of the article. (shrink)

Статтю присвячено синтаксичній репрезентації мовної особистості в лінгвістичному дискурсі. Об’єктом дослідження стали окличні та інтонаційно незакінчені речення. Їх розглянуто як синтаксичні засоби вираження експресивності в різножанрових працях українських учених – О. І. Бондаря, П. Ю. Гриценка, С. Я. Єрмоленко, Ю. О. Карпенка. Акцентовано увагу на типах, семантиці аналізованих висловлювань та їхньому прагматичному потенціалі.

El objetivo de este artículo es establecer algunas distinciones fundamentales para el estudio de las representaciones epistémicas, y en particular, de las representaciones epistémicas visuales. Para ello, presento tres distinciones estrechamente relacionadas: La primera es una distinción entre las restricciones impuestas a una herramienta por la tarea (que se busca nos ayude a realizar), y aquellas impuestas por nuestras características como usuarios. La segunda es una distinción entre la función estrecha de una representación (que no es sino representar) y su (...) objetivo más amplio, el cual puede ser epistémico, estético, litúrgico etc. La tercera es una distinción entre la interpretación y la aplicación de una representación, es decir, entre determinar cómo las cosas son de acuerdo a la representación, y determinar si realmente las cosas son como son representadas. Ilustro la utilidad de estas distinciones aplicándolas a un par de ejemplos: un caso de “final de fotografía” y un diagrama en geometría euclidiana. (shrink)

In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two- or three-dimensional tools for conveying information about aspects of their target systems or phenomena of interest. I outline two features of successful visual epistemic representation: that the vehicle of representation contain sufficiently accurate information about the phenomenon of interest for the user’s purpose, and that it convey this information to the user in a manner that makes it readily available to her. I argue that actual epistemic representation may involve (...) tradeoffs between these and is successful to the extent that they are present. (shrink)